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Abstract 
The Black Sea region is a crossroads of cultures, societies and markets that connects countries 
with different customs, languages, ethnic and religious identities. The twelve countries that are 
considered to form the Black Sea region are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Serbia, and Ukraine, which are different in terms of 
economic structure, size and political orientation.  
Throughout history, the cooperation initiatives and unifying factors of the region were 
emphasized or undermined highly depending on international balance of powers and geopolitical 
situation. While political tensions have questioned cooperation horizons in the region, 
entrepreneurship together with private initiatives has been stepping stones for such a prospect. 
Taking into account the fact that the economy has been the unifying factor in the area, Black Sea 
governments have embraced regional cooperation as an important component for their further 
development. This was reflected in the creation of the new cooperative structure, the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) initiated in 1992, which came into existence as a unique and 
promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative. 
This thesis describes the regional context and cooperation patterns in the Black Sea region, with 
a special emphasis on economic cooperation and trade between the Black Sea countries, and 
argues that there has not been an enforcement of any common, inclusive regional agenda so far.  
BSEC member countries do not cooperate with the global world as a solid functioning region, 
but separately, rather through bilateral agreements and cooperation mechanisms, which once 
again questions whether the wider world sees Black Sea as a region, and whether the member 
countries truly consider themselves as part of it. 
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Introduction 
The Black Sea region connects under its umbrella countries with diverse cultural, language, 
ethnic, and religious identities that are also different in terms of the economic structure, size, and 
political orientation. The Black Sea region thus, is not simply a region of geopolitical 
significance but can also be considered as a crossroads of cultures, societies and markets 
(Manoli, 2014)  
The wider Black Sea area occupies a territory of 834,719 sq. km, while the population of the 
Black Sea region comprises of 332 million people living in the territories of the twelve Black Sea 
countries that are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, Serbia, and Ukraine (BSEC). The GDP of the region is estimated to be around 
USD 3.6 trillion (data of 2014).  
Historically, the Black Sea area has not been considered as a socio-economic unity (King, 2006). 
Throughout the years, the cooperation initiatives and unifying factors were emphasized or 
undermined highly depending on international balance of powers and geopolitical situation. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the improvements in economic performance in the region 
have been highly connected with the increase in the cooperation with the global markets. While 
political tensions have questioned cooperation horizons in the region, entrepreneurship together 
with private initiatives has been stepping stones for such a prospect. Taking into account the fact 
that the economy has been the unifying factor in the area, Black Sea governments have embraced 
regional cooperation as an important component for their further development. This was 
reflected in the creation of the new cooperative structure, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) initiated in 1992.  
Since then, a large effort has been made in constructing a regional cooperation in the Black Sea. 
By seeking stability and growth through cooperation, the governments of the member countries 
have included regional cooperation in their development strategies. However, it is debatable, 
whether the Black Sea region has an efficient model of regional cooperation. The Black Sea 
region faces a number of problems that create obstacles for a fruitful cooperation. Although 
BSEC came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and 
economic initiative and was followed by creation of other complementary bodies, there has not 
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been an enforcement of any common, inclusive regional agenda so far. No common regulations 
have been developed between and within the 12 BSEC countries, and unlike other regional 
entities, such as the Balkans or the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea countries have not 
functioned as a common space with a specific regional identity for a long period of time. 
Moreover, a number of unresolved conflicts and accumulated tensions throughout the region’s 
long and complex history divide rather than bring the member countries together. BSEC member 
countries do not cooperate with the global world as a solid functioning region, but separately, 
rather through bilateral agreements and cooperation mechanisms, which once again questions 
whether the wider world sees Black Sea as a region, and whether the member countries truly 
consider themselves as part of it.  
What are the tendencies of intra-regional economic cooperation, and which countries have 
stronger economic ties within the region? Throughout this thesis I will review the current outlook 
of Black Sea area and discuss whether current model of cooperation leads to an improvement in 
the regional cooperation and development. In the first chapter, I will present the Regional context 
of the Black Sea countries, and barriers for their cooperation through the main arguments 
existing in the literature. Next, I will present the economic overview of the region throughout the 
years, the dynamics of main economic indicators, country profiles and economic cooperation on 
the intra-regional level. In the third chapter I will thoroughly discuss the research methodology, 
followed up by the empirical analysis performed in the next chapter. The respective conclusions 
upon the cooperation in the Black Sea Region will be provided in the end of the thesis. 
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Regional Context and Barriers for Cooperation 
 
The concept of regional cooperation lies in the idea that each participating country can obtain 
additional benefits through partnership mechanisms. In order for the cooperation to be efficient 
and coherent, it is necessary to take into account commonalities and differences between the 
states in the particular geographic location (Aydin and Triantaphyllou, 2010). According to 
Aydin (2005), regionalization has been considered as a positive and promising response to 
contemporary problems and challenges. Moreover, he suggests that regional cooperation is 
particularly valuable in the regions that undergo fundamental political and economic 
transformations, as well as in the areas which might originally lack mutual trust and confidence. 
Lake and Morgan (1997) consider that in an ever-independent world, regionalization is a tool of 
regional and global security and stability by facilitating collaborative action against the 
contemporary problems, while Ozer (1997) argues that regionalization negatively affects the 
establishment of new dividing lines and creates multi-layered, trans-boundary, cooperative 
networks. On the other hand, when considering regional organizations, it should be mentioned 
that they can play a complementary role to broader arrangements like the EU and NATO by 
preparing their members for future accession in larger organizations through their stronger 
economic and social foundations for integration and adoption of specific norms and standards. 
However, in order to benefit from the positive aspects of regionalization, the member countries 
should share some kind of common recognition, and beside the geographical connection, a 
political entity should exist that has enough of internal cohesion that can bind the countries 
together and external difference that can set the group of countries apart from the outside of the 
region area (Ozer, as quoted in Aydin, 2005). 
Stritecky considers that the wider black sea region is geographically predesigned to be contested. 
Asmus and Jackson (2004) don’t hesitate to name the Black Sea region as the Bermuda Triangle 
of Western strategic studies. Regionalization has been seen as a positive and promising response 
to contemporary problems and challenges. Several authors have expressed their doubts whether 
the Black Sea area actually constitutes a region, arguing that it makes little sense geographically, 
historically, or even culturally (Aydin, 2005). Pavliuk and Klympush-Tsintsadze (2015) outlines 
the importance of first and foremost describing the notion of regionalism and whether the Black 
Sea region can be considered as one in order to understand the cooperation in the Black Sea 
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Region. The definition of regionalism remains a difficult task. Geographical proximity can be 
considered as the very first criterion for defining a region. However, does that mean that any 
geographical entity can be defined as a region? Among other key factors are common identity 
and interconnectedness that can be achieved through historical similarities, cultural affinity or 
intensive trade and economic cooperation (Pavliuk and Klympush-Tsintsadze, 2015). 
When discussing the notion of regionalism, Aybak (2001) outlines three main questions that can 
be considered relevant to Black Sea Region as well: First, how do individuals and groups with 
differences in traditions, languages and cultures come to see themselves as part of larger 
territorial entities beyond local communities over time and space? Second, what combination of 
political, military, economic and intellectual power allows to turn geographical boundaries into 
meaningful frontiers of culture, power and identity? The third question is the regionalism itself 
and whether creating a sense of belonging to a broad community is based on territorial 
proximity, common domestic policies or a cooperative foreign policy. 
Various scholars have given different answers to these questions. Political economists usually 
see the growth of the region as either a function rising or declining hegemony or as a response to 
the pressures of globalization. Neoliberal institutionalists and constructivists stress common 
foreign policy goals or shared identities, both of which may be further enhanced by the very 
institutions of cooperation that they have originally spawned. State-level explanations focus on 
the patterns of strategic interaction between domestic elites and international institutions (King, 
2015). 
In case of the Black Sea region, various authors have been skeptical on whether the Black Sea 
area actually constitutes a region based on the above mentioned criteria (Aydin, 2005). Aydin 
outlines that the Black Sea region is known as an “intellectually constructed region” which 
speaks of its weak regional identity. Moreover, the Black Sea region has not been a priority to 
wider international agendas while the member countries themselves cooperate beyond the 
regional structures. Taking into consideration the divergence among the member countries in 
economic, political, social and cultural aspects, the Black Sea has neither external nor internal 
potential for a successful regional building. 
As a region, the Black Sea differs from other regions by the fact that a region is usually being 
created in a place, which was not considered as such and did not have extensive interaction 
among its constituent parts for a long time. Moreover, the attempt of defining the region usually 
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comes from outside rather than from within. We can view this as both a strength and weakness. 
From the strong point of view, the region is not enforced by the outside world, and does not 
create resentment among the participants, but shows their will to interact with each other. The 
weakness is, that the region still requires recognition from the outside world, which was not 
however involved in its creation at the first place (Aydin, 2012). He describes the Black Sea 
region, situated in the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as one that has been a site of contention 
and confrontation for centuries. From the context of the Cold War, the Black Sea region was the 
scene of East-West strategic competition. Throughout forty years, the political and military 
presence of the superpowers provided stability within the region’s nevertheless tense relations. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union had a polarized impact: on one hand the region became a lot 
more difficult to manage, as ancient sources of tensions that had been masked and suppressed 
during the Cold War have been liberated. However, on the other hand, it was a chance to create a 
truly cooperative environment around the Black Sea. After the expansions of NATO and the EU, 
the Black Sea has become the eastern frontier of Europe and can be considered as an integral part 
of it that represents an important strategic region (Aydin, 2012).  
King (2015) considers the Black Sea region as one with common challenges and uncommon 
obstacles. Although there can be seen incentives and tools that allow active participation of the 
region in global economic and international political community, the region’s long and complex 
history with a number of unresolved conflicts and accumulated tensions divide rather than bring 
the member countries together and thus create obstacles for further cooperation. 
King finds that among the reasons why the regional identity of Black Sea area is questioned is 
because the scholars and analysts have recently begun to question the geographical lenses 
through which regions are viewed (King, as quoted in Pavliuk, 2015). If we put aside the 
geographical proximity, the Black Sea region can be seen through a number of other distinctive 
features that can give an answer to the above mentioned questions. The Black Sea Region is one 
of the most heterogeneous and complex areas in wider Europe, with countries that have 
significant difference in size, level of political and geopolitical interests as well as in cultural, 
social and religious traditions. Out of all Black Sea countries, six littoral ones that are Bulgaria, 
Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey are different in their economic and political 
development and if we widen the focus, the diversity in economic performance, political reform 
and basic national interests of twelve Black Sea countries become even more striking. This also 
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shows that the regional boundaries remain vague, varying from actual six Black Sea countries to 
a wider area of twelve countries (Pavliuk, 2015). 
Moreover, these countries are indifferent institutional affiliation with European and Euro-
Atlantic integrated structures. Nine of the Black Sea states are former communist countries, 
while 6 are successor states of the Soviet Union, thus have gone through a rather complex 
process of transition and self-identification, with an unfinished transition. On the other hand, 
there are countries that are members of the European Union, while some countries have 
partnership and cooperation agreements with it. Some of the countries simultaneously have 
memberships in other international organizations and unions and are integrated in the world 
economy through different institutions and cooperation mechanisms. The chart below gives a 
detailed description of the membership of the Black Sea Countries in some of the main 
international organizations (see figure 1). 
BSEC 
member 
Countries 
Post-
Soviet 
Countries 
EU 
member 
Countries 
CIS 
Countries 
Eurasian 
Economic 
Union 
WTO BRICS NATO OSCE G20 
Albania (Soviet 
Satellite) 
Candidate   V  V V  
Armenia V  V V V   V  
Azerbaijan V  V  V   V  
Bulgaria (Soviet 
Satellite) 
V   V   V  
Georgia V  (Former 
State1) 
 V   V  
Greece V V   V  V V  
Moldova V  V  V   V  
Romania  V   V  V V  
Russia V  V V V V  V V 
Serbia  Negotiating      V  
Turkey  Negotiating   V  V V V 
Ukraine V  V  V   V  
Figure 1: Membership of Black Sea Countries in some International Organizations and Unions 
                                                          
1 Withdrew in 2009 as a result of Russian-Georgian War 
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Pavliuk describes the Black Sea Region remains a potentially explosive area, having 
accumulated a number of security problems and significant conflict potential, territorial disputes, 
existence of entities unrecognized by the wider world, etc. Moreover, these conflicts are 
overshadowing regional relations, trade and economic cooperation and overall potential of Black 
Sea regional role. 
Conflicts in the Black Sea Region are quite large in number and include those over NATO 
enlargement, access to the Black Sea, democratization, spheres of interest and the conflict zones 
of Abkhazia (Abkhazia-Georgia Conflict), South Ossetia (South Ossetia-Georgia Conflict), 
Chechnya (Russia-Chechnya Conflict), Nagorno – Karabakh (Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict) and 
Transnistria (Moldova-Transnistria Conflict), tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus 
and the recent Ukraine crisis. The conflicts of the Black Sea Region have attracted the attention 
of the world community, leading to a number of different mediation and peacekeeping efforts. 
However, despite these efforts of concerned state actors and relevant international organizations, 
the prospects for the final resolution of these conflicts remain distant. It is important to mention 
that some of the conflicts in the Black Sea region have resulted in introduction of a new 
academic term which best describes them, which is the term of “Frozen Conflicts”. Despite the 
numerous conflicts in the world, mainly the conflicts of post-Soviet space can be regarded as 
“Frozen”. This can be explained by fact that although the ceasefire agreements have been signed 
by the parties years ago, and there was no military action happening for some period of time, the 
final resolution of the conflicts is still on the agenda of the negotiations of all interested parties 
and mediators (Shelest, 2012). 
The evolution of the Black Sea cooperation reflects the difficult political, security and socio-
economic circumstances in the region and often competing policies of their stakeholders.  
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The experience of Regional Cooperation 
 
Studying the Black Sea regional cooperation process, scholars have identified different 
incentives for the participation of the Black Sea states in cooperation activities as well as 
differences in their motivation for involvement in regional schemes and projects. Manoli (2010) 
outlines, that in the early nineties, most of the Black Sea states have referred to regional 
cooperation in the area in an attempt to revive their own identity after long years of imposed 
Soviet identity. The newly independent states needed partners and geopolitical space to develop, 
and therefore reacted positively to the first regional cooperation initiatives. According to Manoli 
(2012), the regional initiatives were seen by the former Soviet states as a means to enhance their 
international standing and the newly gained statehood and by the main powers in the region as a 
new opportunity to assert regional leadership and to maintain their influence. Moreover, regional 
cooperation schemes would allow avoiding economic fragmentation and political conflicts 
(Manoli, 2010). In this regard, two main reasons for the foundation of new regional 
organizations in the Black Sea can be outlined: First, the attempt of the countries to stabilize 
their sovereignty and security after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and second creation of 
common market (Bakos 1993 as quoted in Canli, 2006). Thus cooperation in the Black Sea 
region would allow the participating countries to integrate into a broader economic and political 
system (Commission on the Black Sea, 2010). 
According to Cottey (2009), the regional development in Black Sea area can be divided into 3 
phases based on systematic changes together with the evolving domestic context: The first 
formative phase started in the 1990s, triggered by the end of the Cold War and followed by 
systematic changes, geopolitical shifts and the new formed diversified groupings in Europe. 
These changes were a solid ground for the local powers to see the new opportunities for regional 
leadership, while at the same time the newly independent states adopted the notion of 
regionalism in order to enhance their national standing and address development and security 
concerns.  
During the first formative phase, one of the most important developments was the formation of 
Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) by 12 Black Sea Countries in 
1992, based on the principle of “stability and peace through prosperity” and aiming at fostering 
cooperation in the Black Sea region and appear as a stimulus for regional security and political 
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stability. The 3 stepping stones of BSEC were the following motivations: cooperation rather than 
conflict; regionalism as a step to global integration; and avoiding new divisions in Europe. By 
1999 BSEC evolved into the first full-fledged regionally owned economic entity in the area, 
becoming an organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The institutional structure of 
the organization includes a Permanent International Secretariat and four related bodies such as 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), the BSEC 
Business Council (BSEC BC) the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) and the 
International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation was formed in 1992 as an inter-parliamentary consultative body that 
has been aiming its efforts at uniting the national parliaments to provide a legal basis for 
economic, commercial, social, cultural and political cooperation among member countries, as 
well as promote cooperation with other international and regional organizations (PABSEC). 
BSEC Business Council was established in 1992, aimed at lobbying and acting for the 
continuous improvement of business environment throughout the Black Sea Region in order to 
promote business cooperation and regional integration, create beneficial environment for local 
businesses and attract foreign investments (BSEC). As a financial pillar of the BSEC, the Black 
Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) has been established in 1997. A multilateral 
development bank, BSTDB was designed to support economic development and regional 
cooperation through trade and project financing, as well as special projects of supporting small 
and medium enterprises through local financial institutions (BSTDB, 2014). This was followed 
by the creation of think-tank Center of International Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) in 1998, which 
fulfills its function as an independent research and training institution that focuses its studies on 
the Black Sea Region and aims at sustainable development, innovation and governance (ICBSS).  
The second phase of regionalism covered the period of first half of 2000 till 2006, including 
events such as EU enlargement and cooperative processes with NATO, relative stability around 
the black sea. The ending of Balkan unrest and relative stability around the black sea allowed to 
intensively building regional institutions. During the second phase, Community of Democratic 
Choice (CDC) was initiated in 2005, followed by the Black Sea Forum (BSF) in 2006. These 
initiatives were meant to attract political attention to the regional level focusing on issues of 
democratization, good governance, security and civil society. Although, this could be considered 
to be a fair ground for political dialogue, that could raise awareness and attract political attention 
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to the regional level, it did not add cohesion of the Black Sea as a region and their policy 
relevance slowly weakened. 
Third phase of development that started in 2007-2008 can be characterized by three important 
events that have occurred on local and global levels. First event was the expansion of the 
European Union towards Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Second, war that has occurred between 
Russia and Georgia in 2008 that has once again emphasized the security issues of the region. 
Last but not least, the global financial and economic crisis has prioritized all the governments to 
manage macroeconomic imbalances. During this period of time, the European Union has started 
to strengthen its participation in the region. The relationship between the European Union and 
the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation has been characterized as a rather 
limited and uncertain. Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the relationship between the EU and 
the BSEC date back to several years, is reflected in various policy documents and functions in 
terms of both high level political dialogue and working level. (Japaridze et al., 2010). 
At this point, it is important to also mention the relevance of the Black Sea region to the 
European Union. According to Grotzky and Isic, the outline of the Black Sea area, which has a 
transit character and is an energy corridor between Europe and the Caspian Sea, has direct 
implications for different dimensions of European security, including the diversification of 
energy transportation routes. Moreover, in combination with the economic potential and its 
proximity to the EU this signifies a defining European interest in the Black Sea region and its 
strategic importance (Grotzky and Isic, 2008). 
It is crucial to outline the main features and risks that make the region important for the 
European Union. First and foremost, the risk of state failure as well as failure of transition to 
democracy is high in the Black Sea region, together with a number of tensions between the 
member countries, which can directly affect the stability interests of the European Union in the 
region. Moreover, economic market development in the Black Sea region is crucial regarding the 
opportunities for businesses. These interconnected factors together with a possible escalation of 
frozen conflicts can affect energy supplies trade and economic issues (Bauer et al., 2008). 
Concerning the conflict solving, European Union was providing mostly confidence building 
measures in the region. It was generally more comfortable with a post-conflict rehabilitation and 
peace building role, and had been wary of becoming directly involved in conflict resolution. The 
presence of the European Union can be mainly described as an assistance of the development of 
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the region. European Union has developed its own notion of regional multilateralism in its 
eastern neighborhood, and this respectively resulted in formation of two distinct policies: Black 
Sea Synergy in 2008, aimed at increased cooperation among the countries of the Black Sea area, 
and Eastern Partnership launched in 2009 that aimed further acceleration of political association 
and economic integration between the EU and 6 countries of the Black Sea that are Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Despite the fact that both policies were 
distinct, almost parallel launch of both Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy lead to 
scattering the political support (Japaridze et al., 2010).  
Black Sea Synergy, based on the European experience of region building, concentrated on low 
politics issues (economy, infrastructure, etc.) was however unsuccessful in increasing 
cooperation between Black Sea countries because of lack of working program, plan of action and 
funding, Eastern Partnership, on the other hand, was a renewed Europeanization process and was 
designed as a mean to bring Black Sea countries, that, however, have no immediate membership 
prospects, closer to the European Union through more intense bilateral cooperation. Japaridze 
further concludes that despite the fact of initial success of bringing attention to the regional level, 
Black Sea Synergy didn’t bring any tangible change in EU policy or in Black Sea cooperation. 
While the accession of Romania and Bulgaria theoretically has brought the EU into play as a 
direct Black Sea neighbor, the European clique’s policy toward the region is still marked by 
fragmented perceptions of the regions’ problems and interests and a lack of consensus over 
policy goals. Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus countries are covered by the European 
Neighborhood Policy, while Turkey is an accession candidate and Russia enjoys a special 
relationship with the EU based on the EU-Russia policy. Moreover, the EU faces a strategic 
dilemma as Russia is a major stakeholder in numerous ways in the Black Sea region, such as the 
military power and energy as well as the soft power and public opinion (Grotzky and Isic, 2008) 
Various scholars have discussed the cooperation and geopolitics in the Black Sea region, and 
many of them has outlined the challenges for a successful cooperation (European Policy Center 
Report, 2012). Triantaphyllou has outlined the regional prospects from EU dimension. While 
being optimistic about the cooperation perspective between the countries of the Black Sea region 
and seeing a potential, he has been expressing doubts based on the conflicts and infightings 
between some of the participating countries, with competing narratives of what steps should be 
taken. As a result, nationalism and geopolitics are emerging. With no momentum coming from 
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the Black Sea region, Triantaphyllou considers institutional regionalism stalling and even failing. 
As national prerogatives are dominating in EU foreign policy, the impact of EU policy on the 
region’s Europeanisation is not strong. And while EU’s Black Sea policy is driven by the Eastern 
Partnership, a number of problems arise concerning synergy and definition.  
Vardakis (Vardakis et. Al. 2012), on the other hand, sees EU’s wish to cooperate with such a 
complex region as Black Sea through outlining the fact that Black Sea can play a constructive 
role in all the sea basins surrounding the EU, with an objective of practical cooperation that 
benefits people of the region. Vardakis outlines the fact that the Black Sea Synergy does not 
duplicate Eastern Partnership, which looks towards Brussels, while for Black Sea cooperation, it 
is important to transfer EU’s cooperation experience to the region. He also emphasizes the 
bilateral relations with Black Sea countries, which up to a point highlights the fact that in 
practice external cooperation takes place with the countries separately rather than as a region.  
Black Sea region faces a big challenge concerning the external power together with the challenge 
of conceptualizing as a region. It is difficult to measure the degree up to which there is a regional 
cooperation in the Black Sea. Pavliuk describes regions as constructed political groups or 
“imagined communities” that reflect physical or political realities that are acknowledged to be a 
region by the rest of the world. In this regard, the outside world hardly treats the Black Sea area 
as a region, while it is also questionable to what degree the Black Sea identity is viewed as a 
region by the member countries themselves, it is rather viewed as a complementary body which 
questions the countries’ commitment to sustainable region building (Pavliuk, 2015). Unlike the 
Balkans or the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea has not functioned as a common space with a 
specific regional identity for over a hundred years. This has made it vulnerable to being labelled 
with identities from the outside or by dominant actors within or around the region (Grotzky and 
Isic, 2008). As a result, regional definitions tend to be imposed from the outside in relation to 
other neighboring regional actors.  
Numerous factors prevent a common Black Sea regional identity. Crossroad-character of the 
Black Sea is one of those. A look at the Black Sea states shows the region’s character as a space 
of transition between other more conceived regions, such as the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern 
Europe or in a wider sense between Europe and Asia. This makes it difficult to attach a regional 
label to the Black Sea Area. Other factor can be considered the cultural and linguistic 
differences, as the Black Sea region covers a number of different linguistic and cultural spaces. 
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Another factor is the Supra-regional competition: During the Cold War, the Black Sea region 
was once a frontline functioning as a clash zone between NATO in the South (Turkey) and the 
USSR/Warsaw Pact in the North. This divisive label continues to frame the security debate in the 
region, as NATO has been joined by Bulgaria and Romania. 
While the Black Sea region has failed to develop a common identity, there are two competing 
approaches for how to deal with it. Both approaches put the region into a larger context of 
interests and values (Socor, 2006).  
According to the first, the Black Sea region is placed in relation to a wider idea of bringing the 
states of the region closer to Europe, while the other focuses on former Soviet power structures 
and the dominant role of today’s Russia. A competing approach to the Black Sea region is to 
understand the Black Sea area in the context of Russia’s re-emergence as a regional power.  
The northern Black Sea region, excluding EU-members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, as well 
as Turkey is viewed as an area of overlapping interests between the European Union and Russia 
(Moshes, 2007).  
At a various level of economic development, Black Sea countries have various levels of global 
influence and interaction with international actors, while having an array of diverse and 
incompatible interests. As a result, on one hand countries focus on national interests rather than 
region as a whole resulting in no real regional identity, while on the other hand they face difficult 
decision on whether to move towards the direction of Euro-Atlantic integration or create closer 
ties with Russia. 
Manoli (2014), argues that identifying only constraints of the Black Sea regionalism would have 
been misleading. Regionalism in the Black Sea has succeeded in building channels of 
communication and interaction not merely among the political elites but also among people who 
initiate and implement policies, which has a great contribution towards trust building in the 
region. BSEC particularly contributed to confidence building through its permanents 
communication channels and policy achievements particularly in so called ‘low politics’ matters, 
such as for example science and technology. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation has institutionalized political dialogue for democratic stability. Putting 
priority in project development, the Black Sea countries established although limited, but own 
financing mechanisms (among those, the BSEC Project Development Fund and Hellenic 
Development Fund). Manoli also outlines the importance of the Black Sea Trade and 
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Development bank, together with the International Center for Black Sea Studies, which supports 
national and regional development efforts and complement the regional policy through 
conducted research and analysis. Manoli believes, that Black Sea regionalism has gradually 
acquired a project oriented, network building character, rather than focusing on slowly 
developing intergovernmental agreements. 
Pavliuk outlines, that if we view from the prospective of whether the region’s democratic and 
economic development and its enhanced security and stability really matter, in this case, if region 
building and cooperation contribute to those aspects than the region has ultimate success. 
However, it has yet to prove whether Black Sea area has a future as a coherent and distinctive 
region or if it is a transitory phenomenon and a temporary step along the way to wider European 
integration (Pavliuk, 2015). 
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Economic Overview of the Black Sea Region 
 
From the economic viewpoint, the Black Sea region is characterized on one side by high growth 
rates and on the other by difficulties in implementing schemes of a market place as inward 
environment of the economic system (Grotzky and Isic, 2008). As already mentioned, the Black 
Sea region consists of a heterogeneous group of countries that face different problems and are on 
different levels of development. Their economies differ in size, institutional characteristics and 
integration perspectives. As Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have slowed in growth, the Caucasus 
states have surged, with Azerbaijan taking a momentous lead given its oil boom. At the same 
time, a slowdown for Moldova does not signal well for Europe’s poorest country. Besides, the 
Ukrainian economy has shaken a lot regarding the recent events, while Russia has faced 
recession. Bulgaria and Romania take pride in being part of the European Union’s single market, 
and aim at creating attractive terms for foreign investment. However, despite high rates of 
economic growth, the youngest EU-member states still suffer a need for reforms (Aydin, 2010). 
Throughout the years, the economic performance of the region has changed, from a highly 
unstable performance in the 90’s, total restructuration and movement towards market economy 
for some of the member countries who were previously engaged in central planned economy, 
downturn triggered by the financial crisis, stable economic recovery afterwards accompanied by 
structural changes. In this regard, it is important to mention that although the member countries 
of the Black Sea region are divergent in the level of their economic development, the common 
characteristics for all of them is the fact that they have undergone severe economic turmoil in the 
past decades (Aydin and Triantaphyllou, 2010). Consequently, the rather low level of regional 
integration and weak intra-regional relations can be explained not only by the political issues and 
conflicts discussed in the first chapter, but also by the heterogeneity of the wider Black Sea 
countries. 
During the Cold War, market economies encountered centrally planned ones in the Black Sea 
region. However, after that, all of the countries have shifted towards market economy, which 
Astrov and Havlik (2008) describe in the following 4 phases:  
The first phase lasted until 1995 and outlined a sharp economic decline in the region. It included 
the collapse of the old mechanisms of production and distribution, underdeveloped legal 
frameworks, non-operational financial sectors, inconsistency in structural reforms and overall 
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macroeconomic instability. Astrov and Havlik (2008) outline, that, on one hand, some of the 
transition countries strongly needed quick reforms for state-building. Whereas, non-transition 
countries like Greece and Turkey were facing relatively high inflation and fiscal imbalances 
during this period. Turkey, on the other hand, wasn’t facing deep decline in the period, but 
instead was facing brief recessions in 1991, 1994 and later in 2001. Bulgaria performed at 82% 
compared to the level of 1991, and Russia had the decline of 40% in the GDP in one year and 
reached the bottom line in 1998, followed up by Romania and Ukraine in 1999. Recession was 
more severe in some of the Black Sea countries: Armenia has reached the bottom line in 1994, as 
the GDP declined almost by half, Georgia in 1995 with a GDP decline by nearly two-thirds, and 
Azerbaijan in 1996, with the economy falling by 42% compared to the level of 1991 (see figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2: GDP US$ 1990-2015 
It is important to mention, that the former soviet republics have suffered a deeper economic 
decline than the rest of the Black Sea region countries, emphasizing the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. For these countries, the traditional economic connections were disrupted, which had a 
particularly big impact on the Caucasus. Being engaged in conflicts, military expenses absorbed 
a bigger share of economic resources, thus leaving the opportunity to finance much needed 
reconstruction of the economy (see figure 3). The conflict has resulted in unstable environment, 
created obstacles for cross-border trade flows as well as opportunities for large-scale 
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investments. Moreover, considering the geographical particularity, it was especially difficult for 
these countries to create new economic ties and expand them towards Europe (Astrov and 
Havlik, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Military Expenditures by Country1990-20152 
The second phase took place in the period between 1995 and 1999, when regional economies 
stabilized and improved their security and political stability. Moreover, market oriented 
structural reforms have been strengthened and the region moved towards macroeconomic 
stability. At the same time, however, Black Sea countries dealt with unstable prices on energy as 
well as a financial crisis in Russia in 1998 (Astrov and Havlik, 2008). 
The third phase covered the period from 2000 to the third quarter of 2008. During this period, 
there was a high and sustainable growth of GDP in the region, with the annual average of 6% 
which is equal to a cumulative real expansion of 68%, higher living standards, increase in trade 
and investment. It can be mentioned, that the third phase allowed to view the integration of the 
Black Sea countries through a broader, European and global economic context (Astrov and 
Havlik, 2008).  
                                                          
2 SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
The sources for military expenditure data are primary sources that is official data provided by national governments, either in 
their official publications or in response to questionnaire (National Budget Documents, defense white papers and public finance 
statistics published by ministries of finance and ministries of defense, central banks and national statistical offices, etc.), 
secondary sources (NATO, IMF) which quote primary data; and other secondary sources (special journals and newspapers). 
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The fourth phase, which I would like to discuss broader, started with the global financial and 
economic crisis, with a decline in growth as well as low inflow of foreign capital. However, even 
in the impact of a crisis, the development of the region in comparison to 1999 can definitely be 
seen. The region has achieved prosperity to a certain extent, even though this prosperity is 
distributed unevenly between the countries. On the other hand, the fourth phase has been 
remarkable for a number of changes, creation of organizations, processes and policies that have 
been developed aiming at improving the intra-regional dynamics as well as cooperation and 
economic integration between the countries of the Black Sea (Astrov and Havlik, 2008). 
The global economic crisis has had a lingering effect on the economies of the Black Sea 
countries. Since 2009, when the region has suffered a short but severe recession in the aftermath 
of the global economic crisis, there was a trend of slowing economic growth. While registering a 
GDP growth rate of average 5.9% in the period between 2001-2008 the GDP was negatively 
affected by the global economic crisis and dragged down to -6.5% in 2009. In 2014, after several 
years of constant declining but at the same time positive rates of economic growth, the average 
real GDP growth for the region reached to the point of 1.1%, while in 2015 it is estimated to 
reach the bottom line of -0.7% (BSTDB, 2011) (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Black Sea Region Average Annual GDP Growth3 
This positive performance was, however, overshadowed, by the fact that for the fifth consecutive 
year the rate of growth has subsided, and a progress of just a little over one percent was achieved 
                                                          
3 Most of the data in this chapter was taken from the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank calculations from National 
Statistical Agencies of the countries of the Black Sea Region and the International Monetary Fund IFS Database, as well as 
Global Economic Prospects reports of the World Bank and World Economic Outlook publications of IMF.  
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in reducing poverty rates, and even less in achieving convergence with the wealthy economies of 
western Europe. Moreover, Regional per capita incomes declined nine percent, from USD 
11,400 for 2013 to USD 10,400 for 2014; while this figure is primarily a function of the sharp 
rise in the US dollar in late 2014 and the even sharper depreciations of a number of regional 
currencies, it was also affected by weak overall growth. Moreover, it represents a return to pre-
crisis 2008 levels. 
In fact, it can be seen that the region has not sustained the recovery that has been initially 
achieved during the period of 2010-2011. This period can be described as a short term recovery 
that was triggered by factors such as the recovery of global commodity prices, crucially 
important for some of the region’s economies. With global growth slowing to 2.4% in 2015, the 
Black Sea Region was the weakest performing region for the second consecutive year, together 
with Latin America and the Caribbean (See Figure 5). The growth of the region was weaker than 
in the Eurozone area which has been among the weakest performing areas of the world economy 
over the last several years, and it was well off the 3.1% outcome achieved by the Central and 
Eastern European and Baltic states, most of whom joined the European Union in 2004 and being 
former transition countries can be compared to the countries of the Black Sea region. 
 
Figure 5. Global GDP growth since 2008 
The global financial crisis of 2008 expanded quickly in the transition and emerging market 
economies of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and reversed the economic progress of 
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years. Access to capital markets dried-up, capital flows reversed, investment stagnated, and the 
decline in demand resulted in significant decline in the output. By 2009 there was a significant 
slowdown in economic activity. (BSTDB Annual Report, 2015). 
The global financial crisis left a negative and large impact on the countries of the Black Sea 
region. Not only was there decline in economic activity, deterioration of public finances and an 
increase in unemployment, but also a decline in the foreign trade. The international trade flows 
have dropped. Moreover, protectionism measures were adopted by the developed countries, 
creating a harmful impact on the exports from the Black Sea region. However, the Black Sea 
region managed to gain healthy economic growth, to which one of the main contributors was the 
international trade. Export grew, reaching around a 25.3% growth in 2010, indicating a full 
recovery from sharp decline of 31,7% in external trade that occurred during the recession of 
2009 (Rhodes, 2012).   
 
Figure 6: External Trade of the Black Sea Region 1999-2015 
The weak economic performance in 2015 can be mainly described by the large carry overs from 
2014 and 2013. It is important to mention, that the main factors were before mentioned decline in 
commodity prices, that intensified the increasingly unfavorable terms of trade for commodity 
exporters. Grotzky and Isic (2008) outline the fact that some of the countries in the Black Sea 
region rely heavily on their role as an energy transit or energy producing country. Armenia and 
Georgia for example are relatively small producers and consumers of energy, but host important 
oil and gas transit routes. The second largest oil pipeline, the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan pipeline 
(BTC), invented and constructed by US-companies, passes through Azerbaijan, Turkey and 
Georgia. The status of being a transit country can be viewed as both an advantage and 
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disadvantage. On one hand the countries gain territorial strategic relevance, which entails 
conflict potential to the fact, that somehow transit areas are always hotly contested regions, from 
energy exporters as well as energy importers. On the other hand, being a transit country assures 
certain advantages when it comes to negotiations, both economic and political. Among the Black 
Sea countries, particularly Russia and Azerbaijan were highly affected as energy producers. This 
however, could be considered a beneficial factor for importers for the following reasons: First 
and foremost, because of the tight economic relations between a number of countries with Russia 
the downturn in economic activity created secondary negative impact in their domestic 
economies. In this situation the main reasons were the decrease in remittance levels sent by 
emigrant workers, as well as the lower demand for exports from Russia. It is also important to 
mention, that there is a noticeable distinction between eastern and western parts of the Black Sea 
region. While the eastern part of the black sea region had a better performance during 2010-
2012, the trend reversed largely during 2013-2014. Albania, Bulgaria and Greece each 
experienced an increase in real GDP growth in 2014, against the Region’s overall declining 
trend. Second, because of the limited boost to consumption in fuel importing countries the 
households had to pay extra money to cover the accumulated debts or other obligations as well as 
increase their savings in order to face the uncertainty of economic outlooks. 
Among the factors that have affected the economic performance of the region were the 
uncertainties and imbalances created by the asymmetric monetary policies followed by the 
leading global economies, namely the United States and the members of Eurozone. In case of the 
United States, the US Federal Reserve leaned towards monetary tightening, while the European 
Central Bank initiated further quantitative easing and moving into negative interest rates aimed 
at increasing the activity in the economies of the Eurozone. These led to a polarized effect on the 
Black Sea region: While the monetary easing initiated by the Eurozone had a positive spillover 
effect particularly in the Balkans that have close ties to the Western Europe, the monetary 
tightening initiated by the United States had a highly negative impact on financial outflows from 
emerging markets.  
Financial flows have decreased immensely in 2014, reaching USD 32 billion (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Capital Flows to Emerging Europe 
According to figure 6 for the net financial flows to Emerging Europe, the impact more dramatic 
for countries with lower investment, trade and financing linkages with Eurozone economies such 
as the ones in the eastern part of the Black Sea Region. There was a sharp increase in outflows 
that began in the second half of 2014 and deteriorated further in 2015, and net flows for 2015 
established new records for worst performance. Private flows turned negative for the first time, 
something which did not occur even in 2009 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the 
extended freezing of capital markets which followed. Official flows, which include bilateral 
creditors and international financial institutions such as IMF and development banks, increased 
by 195% relative to 2014, with international financial institutions increasing their net lending 5.6 
times to USD 17.4 billion, their highest levels since 2009–2010. However, even this dramatic 
rise was outpaced by the much larger level of private outflows, leaving net flows negative.  
Another consequence of the financing from emerging markets towards the United States was a 
dramatic strengthening in the value of the US dollar. This has created new set of difficulties, of 
which the most significant was the depreciation of local currencies. In some of the economies, 
this had a destabilizing and dampening effect on economic activity. The currency depreciation 
also led to sharp rises in price levels in the most affected economies.  
Moreover, the US dollar’s appreciation resulted in increasing the external debt levels, both 
public and private, for dollar borrowing. For economies with high levels of external dollar debt, 
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the rise appeared to have dramatic results. International trade was also a casualty of the 
combination of currency depreciation, economic volatility and worsening terms of trade for key 
exporters. Not only were dollar values lower, the economic slowdown resulted in reduced 
economic activity. As a result, total Black Sea Region export of goods fell to levels below those 
of 2010, and as a share of GDP declined by -25.1% in 2015, relative to 2014, with declines 
sharpest in energy exporters. Similarly, import of goods region-wide fell below 2010 levels and 
as a share of GDP declined by -24.8% in 2015.  
Private consumption, the largest contributor to GDP on the demand side, predictably shrank by -
3.9% across the Region, relative to 2014. In an effort to offset some of this decline via counter-
cyclical spending, government consumption rose by an estimated 1.6% in 2015. However, as 
state spending accounts for only about 17–18% of regional GDP, it could not fill the gap made 
by the contraction of private consumption, which accounts for nearly 60% of GDP.  
Gross fixed investment also declined in 2015, by -3.8%. As a share of GDP expenditure, it fell 
from 19.7% to 18.5%, underscoring the weakness in investment that has afflicted the Region.  
Figure 7 describes the declining trend in gross fixed investment in recent years, where a healthy 
recovery in 2010 and 2011 following the 2009 recession has been succeeded by years of steady 
decline. 
 
Figure7: Annual Change in Gross Fixed Investment in the Black Sea Region 
When showing the relation between the Gross fixed investment and the GDP (see figure 4), we 
can see a positive correlation between the two: The trend of decline of GDP in 2010 closely 
matches with the trend in declining of the gross fixed investment during the same period of time, 
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with the Gross Fixed investments having more intensive upturns and downturns than the GDP. 
The pattern can put doubts on the prospects of regional economic growth, as the investment rates 
affect both the current growth as well as the capacity of the economy to further create wealth, 
thus the potential growth. Hence, the decline in the investments can have a damaging effect on 
the economy of the countries of the Black Sea region by affecting both the current growth and 
the ability to achieve higher growth in the future.  
It is also important to understand the origins of the GDP in the Black Sea region, which can be 
described as following: 
Services sector that had a rapid growth during the period of 2000-2008 account for around 50-
60% of the GDP formation in the Black Sea region. The exceptions are energy producing 
Azerbaijan, and the countries with larger tourism sectors, where the services cover nearly 70% of 
GDP formation. In 2009 the services declined by 4.2% in comparison to 2008, while in 2014, 
Services comprised of around 56% of the GDP. It is important to mention, that the slowing in the 
service sector has affected the GDP growth. Tourism is considered to be developed in the region, 
and is a source of revenue in many of the countries in the area. Out of the whole global tourism, 
around 12% that comprises for around 106 million people, is hosted by the Black Sea region. 
Moreover, with the development of infrastructure in the region, the rates of intra-regional 
tourism have also increased in the recent years. However, in 2015, the services sector has 
declined by 1,3% relative to 2014. 
Industrial sector has around 25-40% in GDP formation in Black Sea countries. Once again the 
exception is Azerbaijan that has around 60% share of industry. Interestingly, in the boom period 
of 2000-2008, the sector has steadily declined in share, while during the recession of 2009 
industry declined by 8.9%. In 2010 and 2011, the sector has grown respectively by 6.4% and 
4.3%, supporting the regional recovery. In 2014 32% of GDP in the region was accounted by 
industry. In 2015 industry has declined by 0.9% in comparison to 2014.  
The share of agriculture has steadily eroded since the beginning of the last decade from over 
10% of GDP formation to 5.6% in 2014 and around 6% in 2015. The sector’s stability is 
followed by variations, caused by factors such as changing weather conditions and global 
commodity price fluctuations (Manoli, 2014). In 2015 agriculture has achieved growth of 3.8% 
in comparison to 2014. 
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The in detail description of the GDP formation of the BSEC countries is described in the figure 
below (Central Intelligence Agency Data 2014) (figure 8): 
Country Agriculture Industry Services 
Albania 21.9% 14.9% 63.3% 
Armenia 19.4% 28.7% 52.9% 
Azerbaijan 6% 51.9% 34.9% 
Bulgaria 5.1% 27.6% 67.2% 
Georgia 9.2% 22.1% 68.7% 
Greece 4% 15.2% 80.8% 
Moldova 14.1% 21.1% 64.7% 
Romania 4.8% 41.3% 53.9% 
Russia 4.6% 32.6% 62.1% 
Serbia 9.5% 41.9% 48.6% 
Turkey 8.7% 27% 67.8% 
Ukraine 14.1% 26.4% 60% 
Figure 8: GDP Composition by Sector 2014 
Basically, the reasons for overall weakness in BS in 2014 can be described by the fact that key 
trade and financial partners of the Black Sea countries, that are the European Union and 
Eurozone emerged from the recession of 2012-13, but continued to experience weak demand. 
The EU also continued unwittingly to ‘export’ uncertainty with respect to monetary policy of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in the Eurozone as well as the financial sector regulation.  
The regional picture has also had its negative impact on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Figure 
9). FDI dipped dramatically in 2009 during the Region’s short sharp recession. It recovered 
during 2010-2013, although it did not come close to pre-crisis peak levels, registering between 
2.5-3.0% of GDP. In 2014, it once again fell sharply, to around USD 55 billion, nearly 49% 
lower than the USD 107.9 billion that took place in 2013. Even considering the rise in the value 
of the dollar, the reduction was substantial and this can be seen in its size relative to GDP, as the 
share of regional FDI/ GDP fell from 2.9% in 2013 to only 1.6% for 2014. In 2015, the FDI has 
experienced another weak year, declining further for 24% amounting USD 41 billion, compared 
to the USD 55 billion in the previous year.   
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Figure 9: FDI and Remittances in the Black Sea Region 2000-2015 
The weak investment flows are problematic not only for their immediate dampening effect on 
GDP growth, but also for their longer run drag on potential GDP growth in future years. 
Investment is necessary to expand and modernize infrastructure on the one hand, and to increase 
the wealth generating capacity of a society on the other hand. Investment that is deferred or 
foregone thus negatively impacts economic growth in future years as well and results in lower 
living standards, higher poverty rates, and slower convergence to the income levels of Western 
Europe. 
On the other hand, the remittances for the period have held up. In this regard, it is important to 
mention that the Black Sea Region is an important crossroad of movement of population, while 
some member countries have high levels of immigration, among those, Russia has been the third 
largest source country for remittances in 2014, with outward flows reaching around USD 33 
billion. In 2015 the remittance inflows towards Black Sea countries have amounted to around 
USD 32 billion. However, for the second consecutive year there was a decline in remittance 
levels in nominal dollar terms, decreasing for 7.4% in 2014 from USD 36.5 billion in 2013. 
Currency-wise, there was an increase of remittances in Euros and other local currencies of the 
region. Also, the share of the remittances in the GDP has grown as well, from 0.9% in 2013 to 
1.0% in 2014, with an estimated growth to 1.2% in 2015 (Figure 5). Remittances have been 
impressively stable over the year, and despite the relatively small decline, they were considered 
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to be one of the most important sources of financing into the black sea region as of 2015, going 
second to FDI. 
In terms of poverty alleviation impact, remittances have proven to be targeted better than some 
other sources of financing.  
Manoili (2010) outlines, that the migration in the region spreads economic and social effects. 
Around 23 million migrants in the Black sea region account for 6.8% of the overall population. 
Intra-regional migration plays a very important role in the area: In 2008, it has covered 59% of 
the total immigration to the Black Sea region that was around 13.6% migrants. This high rate of 
immigration among the member countries can be explained through several important factors, 
such as the close ties that are left from the Soviet Union era, as well as visa free movement that 
exists in the CIS region complemented by the current visa facilitation regimes. On the other 
hand, there is a growing number in migration from North Africa, Central Asia and Middle East, 
which mainly affects western countries of the region. 
The largest sources of emigration usually are the countries or regions with higher levels of 
poverty and unemployment, which results in the remittances flowing towards the population that 
is most affected by the two before-mentioned factors. Thus, these flows help to achieve higher 
impacts than for example the development assistance programs that are usually smaller in size 
and often are influenced by political priorities, and before being expanded towards the ultimate 
beneficiaries they flow through central government channels.  
It is important to mention that the remittances highly vary among the countries of the Black Sea 
region. With the overall amount of 1.2% of GDP, remittances account for around 0.5% of the 
GDP in wealthier and larger countries, the smaller and poorer countries of the region they 
account for at least 10% of the GDP, reaching as high as 27%. In these poorer countries, the 
remittances are the representation of the most important source of foreign capital inflows. They 
help to alleviate poverty as well as cover a great portion of structural trade deficits of countries 
and improve the current account imbalances. 
The main reasons behind the economic downturn in the recent years can be explained by the 
falling prices on energy and commodity, the conflicts throughout the region together with the 
sanctions, variable monetary policies of the large global economies followed up by the financial 
turmoil and capital outflows. 
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While the Black Sea region has faced a contraction, the member countries have performed 
differently. The considerable variation has formed the pattern, where, as a rule, the countries in 
the western part of the Black Sea region have improved their economic growth performance in 
2015 in comparison to 2014, while viewing the eastern part of the region, worse results were 
achieved. The difference in the performance extends to a number of key macroeconomic 
indicators (see figure 10). As it can be seen from the table, the countries of the Black Sea region, 
previously having generally low, single digit inflation, have experienced increases in 2014. The 
main reason for this was experiencing the currency devaluations. Western countries of the region 
were less affected by the devaluation, because of a lower volatility of the Euro in 2015, as well 
as their membership or closer linkages to the European Union and consequently currencies that 
are either Euro or have close linkages to it.  
 
Figure 10: Summary of Key Economic Indicators for 2015 
The economic slowdown had a modestly negative impact on fiscal balances. On the one hand, 
counter-cyclically motivated government spending grew moderately, while on the other hand 
reduced economic activity resulted in lower receipts from taxes and other sources of revenue. 
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Figure 11: Trends in Average Fiscal Deficit of Black Sea Region as a Share of GDP 
In 2014 the average fiscal deficit was -1.5%. For most of the countries, the fluctuations were 
small, with the exception of Greece, that has improved to 8% of the GDP, consequently 
achieving a surplus, while Georgia, which has made a public investment in order to improve the 
existing infrastructure, and because of that has went from +2.6% of GDP to a deficit of 2.4%. In 
2015 for the Region as a whole, the weighted average fiscal deficit expanded to -2.8% for 2015 
in comparison to 2014 (see figure 11).  
This image outlines the historical pattern of fiscal responsibility established by the Black Sea 
region countries throughout the years. 
Items such as government spending have an added importance since they are under the control of 
regional governments, in contrast to factors such as financial market volatility, monetary 
policies, commodity prices, many geopolitical developments that are determined by global 
environment and by the globally influential economies, hence, being outside of the control of the 
region itself.   
These influences can have significant domestic impact; however, the governments of the region 
cannot really influence these external forces. Thus, they have focused on areas that are possible 
to affect: Governments have been trying to maintain relatively low or moderate levels of public 
debt that can be serviced sustainably. Moreover, since the global financial crisis, the 
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governments have also started paying attention to reducing private external debt levels together 
with the public ones, as continued dependence upon external financing had proven a major 
source of vulnerability, and resulted in more severe recessions.  
Governments have also made efforts regarding the business environment of the countries.  
According to the World Bank’s Doing Business annual surveys, Black Sea Region countries 
have consistently been among the best reformers over the last decade, and in the 2016 report, 
eleven out of the twelve countries were credited with undertaking business reforms in 2014–
2015 that made it easier to do business, for a lengthy list of significant measures such as starting 
a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, obtaining credit and 
electricity, protecting minority investors, reducing transaction costs for international commerce, 
enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and reducing taxes and tax payment costs.  
It is interesting to observe the changes in the business environment, namely the improvements in 
the environment where firms operate4. In this regard, five of the Black Sea countries have been 
figured in the top 30 “most improved” list of the World Bank’s “Doing Business Report” for the 
period of 2010-2011. Moreover, two of the countries figured in top ten list: One of which is 
Armenia, that has been the ninth on the global scale, and the other one is Moldova, rated second.  
Overall image of the Ease of Doing Business Index for the period of 2006 to 2015 is described in 
the figure below (Figure 12) (Ease of Doing Business, World Bank, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Ease of Doing Business Index created by the World Bank allows us to observe the business environment of the countries. This 
index looks at domestic small and medium enterprises that are the engine of growth and job creation for most economies around 
the world and measures the efficiency, quality accessibility and simplicity of regulations applying to them. The Ease of Doing 
Business Index is based on ten pillars that are: 
1. Starting a Business 
2. Dealing with Construction Permits 
3. Getting Electricity 
4. Registering Property 
5. Getting Credit 
6. Protecting Investors 
7. Paying Taxes 
8. Trading Across Borders 
9. Enforcing Contracts 
10. Resolving Insolvency (Closing Business) 
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Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Improvement 
Albania 115 120 135 86 82 77 82 85 90 68 +47 
Armenia 37 34 39 39 43 61 55 32 37 45 -8 
Azerbaijan 100 99 96 96 38 69 66 67 70 80 +20 
Bulgaria 59 54 44 45 44 57 59 66 58 38 +21 
Georgia 112 37 18 18 11 17 16 9 8 15 +97 
Greece 111 109 106 96 109 101 100 78 72 61 +50 
Moldova 88 103 92 103 94 99 81 83 78 63 +25 
Romania 71 49 47 47 55 65 72 72 73 62 +23 
Russia 97 96 106 106 120 124 120 112 92 62 +35 
Serbia 95 68 91 94 88 88 92 86 93 91 +4 
Turkey 84 91 57 57 73 73 71 71 69 55 +29 
Ukraine 132 128 139 139 142 149 152 137 112 96 +36 
Figure 12: Ease of Doing Business 2006-2015 
If we look through the whole indicated period, it can be seen that Georgia was the country that 
had the best improvement throughout the period, from the position of 112th in 2006 to 15th in 
2015. Armenia, on the other hand has performed worse in 2015, moving from the position of 36th 
in 2006 to 45th in 2015. The best performers of the region in 2015 were Georgia, with the 15th 
ranking worldwide, Bulgaria, with 38th ranking worldwide and Armenia, with 45th ranking 
worldwide. The worst performers of the region in 2015 were Ukraine, Serbia and Albania, with 
the rankings of 96th, 91th and 68th respectively (Ease of Doing Business Report, World Bank 
2015). 
The following Graph (see graph 13) allows us to see the performance of the Black Sea countries 
by Ease of Doing Business Index Pillars in 2015: 
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Country Start  
a 
Business 
Deal with 
Constuction 
Permit 
Get 
Electricity 
Register 
Property 
Get 
Credit 
Protect 
Investors 
Pay 
Taxes 
Trade 
Across 
Borders 
Enforce 
Contracts 
Resolve 
Insolvency 
Albania 41 157 152 118 36 7 131 95 102 44 
Armenia 4 81 131 7 36 49 41 110 119 69 
Azerbaij
an 
12 150 159 10 104 51 33 166 31 94 
Bulgaria 49 101 125 57 23 14 89 57 75 38 
Georgia 5 3 37 1 7 43 38 33 23 122 
Greece 52 88 80 116 71 62 59 48 155 52 
Moldova 35 175 149 22 23 56 70 152 42 58 
Romani
a 
38 140 171 63 7 40 52 65 51 46 
Russia 34 156 143 12 61 100 49 155 14 65 
Serbia 66 186 84 72 52 32 165 96 96 48 
Turkey 72 136 34 54 89 13 56 90 38 109 
Ukraine 76 70 185 59 17 109 108 154 43 142 
Figure 13: Ease of Doing Business Pillars 2015 
These changes are aimed at increase in domestic and foreign investment and sustainable growth. 
However, the downward trend of the previous years in the region together with the exogenous 
political and economic developments creates a pessimistic outlook on the growth in the 
upcoming period. In order to measure the business environment in the Black Sea region, it is 
important to also consider the country risk survey, as it relates to the likelihood that a non-
business situation might occur, and as a consequence, threaten the normal operation of the 
company, the value of assets or the profitability of loans and investments. Country risk 
environment can be measured by the Euromoney’s Country Risk surveys5 (see figure 14).   
                                                          
5 Country risk is defined as the weighted sum of a collection of scorings including (i) macroeconomic performance and stability; 
(ii) security, political and social stability; (iii) perceptions of public and private governance including implementation capacity, 
transparency, and corruption; (iv) quality and clarity of a country’s legal and tax frameworks and the quality of the 
implementation thereof; and (v) overall the ability of economic entities to operate smoothly. 
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Figure 14: Trends in Regional Euromoney Country Risk Scores and Relative Differences 
Declining country risk is directly correlated to an improving business environment.  
In the Black Sea region, the country risk scores have been improved from 1998 until 2010, 
followed by a decline in the period of 2011-2014. The declining trend has been stabilized in 
2015. 
When compared to other key regions, Black Sea countries had a relatively steady level of 
difference in absolute terms compared to the CEE and Baltic states, with a slightly rising trend 
since 2009. Relative to the original EU 15 members, the country risk levels have declined 
steadily from 1998 to 2010 in the Black Sea region, with a contrast of a slight deterioration from 
2010 to 2012, followed up with stabilization. In this regard, the continuous decline is a cause for 
concern and need to intensify reforms and take measures to improve the business environments 
and overall performance in the Black Sea region. However, the EU 15 have triggered a negative 
influence of post financial crisis economic difficulties. The EU collectively is a major economic 
actor, and also represents the principal trade partner and source of investment and other forms of 
financing for the Black Sea Region. Thus, its influence over the neighboring Black Sea Region is 
very large and in the same way it used to represent a source of stability finance and positive 
externalities during the 2000–2008 period of high growth, it has had a more ambivalent impact in 
recent years, exporting uncertainty, policy and financial volatility, and poor growth prospects.  
It can be concluded, that the poorer scores of the Black Sea region in the recent years didn’t 
widen the gap between the countries of the region and the wealthy economies of the Western 
Europe. Instead, the negative performance of the Black Sea region can be connected to the trends 
in the Western European economies. 
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Economic profiles of Black Sea Countries: in the Black Sea Region 
and the Wider World 
One of the bodies that financially support regional cooperation and development through various 
projects is before mentioned BSTDB6, which uses its financial instruments to provide funding 
for projects that trigger trade and capital flows.  
Within the Black Sea Region, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation prioritizes 
the following areas of cooperation (BSEC):  
• Agriculture 
• Banking and Finance 
• Combating Crime 
• Culture 
• Customs Matters 
• Emergency Assistance 
• Education 
• Energy 
• Environmental Protection 
• Exchange of Statistical Data and Information 
• Healthcare and Pharmaceutics 
• Information and Communication Technologies 
• Institutional Renewal and Good Governance 
• Science and Technology 
• SMEs 
• Tourism 
• Trade and Economic Development 
• Transport 
It is worth mentioning that BSTDB is committed to support only those operations, not only don’t 
harm the environment, instead they strengthen the environmental management of its Clients and 
help address global environmental concerns. Banks environmental policy follows sustainability 
principles that have been developed based on good international practices such as World 
                                                          
6 BSTDB serves 11 of the 12 BSEC member countries (except from Serbia) 
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Bank/IFC performance standards, EHS guidelines (environmental health and safety), EBRD 
performance requirements, EU environmental and social standards, WHO standards (BSTDB 
Annual Report, 2014).  
Some of those standards are (BSTDB): 
• Pollution prevention and mitigation 
• Respect for fundamental human rights in the working environment 
• Protection of the Black Sea against pollution 
• Addressing climate change,  
• Promoting sustainable use of natural resources, etc. 
In 2014 Bank’s activities in the region were disbursed in following way (see figure 15): 
 
Figure 15: Outstanding Operations by Country  
It can be seen that the largest share goes to Russia with 23.6%, followed by Turkey at 17.9% and 
Romania at 12.5% (BSTDB). 
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank has financed a wide array of sectors. The biggest 
amount of financing that covers 46.2% out of total, has been given to financial institutions. 
Among other significant exposures were industrials, consumer staples, materials and utilities 
which together with the financial institution financing covers around 90% of the outstanding 
portfolio (see figure 16) (BSTDB Annual Report, 2014). 
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Figure 16: Cumulative Signed Operations by Sector 2014 
The strategic focus of the bank is on the SME sector development, trade finance, leasing and 
mortgage lines of credit extended through financial intermediaries in member countries. 
The Bank values its cooperation with other financiers in mobilizing investment in the Black Sea 
region and realizing cross-country operations. Such operations possess high shareholder value 
for the Bank and are therefore priority activities (BSTDB Doing Business with BSTDB, 2014). 
Some of the selected projects of 2014 were the following (BSTDB Annual Report, 2014): 
Trade within the Black Sea Region among its member countries show 2 clearly discernible 
trends in the Region. In the period up to the global financial crisis, intra-regional trade grew 
rapidly and systematically as a share of overall trade and GDP. This can be considered as an 
evidence of increasing regional cooperation. The growth peaked at 9.1% of regional GDP and 
18.4% of total external trade in 2008. During the recession of 2009 and the freezing up of 
international markets that followed the crisis, trade levels dropped sharply in 2009 before 
recovering to a large degree in 2010. However, since 2010 the share of intraregional trade to 
overall external trade has been slowly but surely eroding, whereas the share of intra-BSEC trade 
to GDP picked up in 2010 and 2011, nearly reaching pre-crisis levels, but has since also gone 
into a gradual but notable slide in 2012 and 2013 (see figure 17) (BSTDB Annual Report 2014).  
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Figure 17: Intra-regional Trade flows in the black sea region 1999-2013 
These are not long term trends and can certainly change from year to year, but they do suggest 
that some of the factors underlying the overall economic sluggishness, of which the Region’s 
geopolitical tensions are likely the most important, are having an effect on trade flows and 
consequently on the degree of regional cooperation (Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea, 
2014). 
Intra-regional trade is a crucial composite of regional cooperation. In order to have a better 
understanding of the trade in the region, in-detail analyses of countries have been performed 
through discussing country profiles, main trade partners and trends of exports. 
Albania 
Albania is the 134th largest export economy in the world and has the rate of 110th most complex 
economy according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC, 2014). In geographical 
description, Albania’s neighboring countries from the Black Sea Economic Cooperation are 
Greece and Serbia, while it also borders with Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia by 
land, and Croatia and Italy by sea. In comparison with other Black Sea Region countries, Albania 
was the most closed economy of the Communist past, with its statistical data being confidential 
and unreliable. Now it can be described as a developing country with a modern open-market 
economy (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Albania managed to weather the first waves of the global financial crisis, remaining quite stable 
and managing to not experience a vast economic downturn (Erudicia, 2010). This is because 
Albania has been relatively less vulnerable to shocks of traditional low income countries; 
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namely, those concerning exports, prices, remittances and Foreign Direct Investments (Westin, 
2009). However, more recently, the negative effects of the crisis have caused a significant 
economic slowdown: close trade, remittance, and banking sector ties with Greece and Italy make 
Albania vulnerable to spillover effects of debt crises and weak growth in the euro zone (Central 
Intelligence Agency). 
GDP composition per sector shows that the largest share of GDP is covered by Services at 
63.3%, followed by Agriculture at 21.9% and Industry at 14.9% (see figure 18, see also figure 
8): 
 
Figure 18: GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
In terms of agriculture the main production covers wheat, corn, potatoes, vegetables, fruits, sugar 
beets, grapes, meat and dairy products, while the main directions of the industry are food and 
tobacco products, textiles and clothing, lumber, oil, cement, chemicals, mining, basic metals, 
hydropower. It is also important to mention that the workforce occupied by sectors is 41.8% for 
Agriculture, 11.4% for Industry and 46.8% for Services respectively. 
The GDP composition by end use is shared among household consumption (85.8%), government 
consumption (10.6%), investment in fixed capital (27.7%) and in inventories (1.7%), export of 
goods and services (36.7%) and import of goods and services (-62.5%) respectively (Central 
Intelligence Agency). 
21,90% 
14,90% 
63,30% 
0 
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In 2014, Albania exported around USD 2.4 billion and imported USD 4.2 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 1.8 billion. The top exports of Albania are Crude 
Petroleum (USD 444 million), Leather Footwear (USD 276 million), Footwear Parts (USD 147 
million), Chromium Ore (USD 117 million) and Non-Knit Men's Suits (USD 81.8 million). Its 
top imports are Refined Petroleum (USD 547 million), Cars (USD198 million), Packaged 
Medicaments (USD 129 million), Tanned Equine and Bovine Hides (USD 97.4 million) 
and Footwear Parts (USD 86.2 million) 7. The main export partners of Albania are Italy (USD 
1.15 billion), Spain (USD 168 million), China (USD 130 million), Turkey (USD 92.8 million) 
and India (USD 88.5 million). The main import partners are Italy (USD1.38 billion), Greece 
(USD 413 million), Turkey (USD 315 million), China (USD 278 million) and Germany (USD 
235 million). Thus we can see that 2 of the Black Sea countries, namely Greece and Turkey are 
among the main trade partners of Albania (Papava, 2010). The cumulative export of Albania 
towards the Black Sea countries was around USD 412million in 2014. In 2014 the biggest 
partners in the Black Sea region after Greece and Turkey are Bulgaria (USD 26.1 million) and 
Russia (USD 19.4 million). It is interesting to mention, that Albania hasn’t had any export to 
Armenia up until 2011, reaching to only USD 60 thousand in 2014. The lowest amount of export 
of Albania was to Azerbaijan, which similarly has started cooperation in 2011, and by 2014 
reached a very moderate amount of around USD 2000 (WITS).  
 
Armenia 
 
Armenia is a landlocked country that neighbors with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey. It is 
the 141st largest export economy in the world and the 64th most complex economy according to 
the Economic Complexity Index (OEC, 2014). Under the old Soviet central planning system, 
Armenia developed a modern industrial sector, supplying machine tools, textiles, and other 
manufactured goods throughout the Soviet Union, in exchange for raw materials and energy. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its profile has changed rapidly, which was fueled also by 
                                                          
7 The data on exports and imports of products in this chapter was based on1992 revision of the HS (Harmonized System) 
classification.  
The Harmonized System is a multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by the World Customs Organization 
(WCO). It comprises about 5,000 commodity group and is used by more than 200 countries and economies as a basis for their 
Customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade statistics, covering over 98% of the merchandise in international trade 
classification. The HS contributes to the harmonization of Customs and trade procedures, and the non-documentary trade data 
interchange in connection with such procedures, thus reducing the costs related to international trade. 
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the conflict in the region. As a result, 2 of Armenia’s borders, namely with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey have been closed since 1991 and 1993, thus leaving only two trade routes that are Iran 
and Georgia (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Although the government has made a number of improvements in tax and customs 
administration in most recent years, corruption is still high, leaving a huge room for 
improvement and additional economic reforms in order to regain economic growth and improve 
competitiveness (Khachatrian, 2009). Armenia's geographic isolation together with a narrow 
export base in important business sectors create big obstacles for Armenia’s economic 
performance. Moreover, an additional vulnerability is exposed on the country based on the big 
dependence on Russian commercial and governmental support in have made it particularly 
vulnerable to the sharp deterioration in the global economy and the economic downturn in 
Russia. Armenia is particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support. 
This includes the ownership and/or management of key infrastructure especially in the energy 
sector (both gas and electricity) together with the remittances from the Armenian citizens who 
work in Russia, as they cover around 20% of the GDP and partially weather country’s trade 
imbalances (Minoian, 2003). 
Armenia’s GDP composition by sector has the following disbursement (see also figure 8): 
 
Figure 19: Armenia’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
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28,70% 
52,90% 
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GDP composition by end use is spread among household consumption (77.7%), government 
consumption (13.1%), Investment in fixed capital (20.8%) and in inventories (0.6%), exports 
(29.8%) and imports (-42%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
In 2014, Armenia exported USD 1.62 billion and imported USD 4.28 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 2.65 billion. The top imported products are petroleum gas (USD 
423 million), refined petroleum (USD 294 million), cars (USD 195 million), gold (USD 143 
million) and diamonds (USD 143 million). Armenia’s top export partners are Russia (UDS 307 
million), China (181 million), Canada (USD 173 million), Germany (USD 160 million) and the 
United States (USD 92.5 million). The biggest partners for import are Russia (USD 989 million), 
China (USD 403 million), Georgia (USD 254 million), Turkey (USD 227 million) and Iran 
(USD 194 million). Armenia has exported around USD 480 mln in 2014. Among the biggest 
partners alongside Russia were Georgia (USD 85 million) and Bulgaria (USD 65 million). Trade 
ties between Armenia and Albania have a recent history and a slow progress, while there is 
absolutely no cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan ever since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (WITS). 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan is the 70th largest export economy in the world and the 108th most complex 
economy according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC, 2014). Azerbaijan borders with 
Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Turkey and Russia by land and Turkmenistan by sea (Central 
Intelligence Agency). 
There is broad consensus among experts and international financial institutions (for example 
IMF) that Azerbaijan has suffered the least from the global financial crisis compared to other 
countries of the post-Soviet world (Hubner and Jainzik, 2009). Two factors have to be taken into 
account in order to understand Azerbaijan’s ability to cope with the global financial crisis better 
than any other post-Soviet country (Badalova, 2009). First and foremost, the underdevelopment 
of its financial sector which is a typical phenomenon that concerns almost all the post-Soviet 
countries, while Azerbaijan has a weaker performance in comparison to Armenia, Georgia, 
Russia and Ukraine (Hubler and Jaznik, 2009) which has turned into an advantage within the 
period of the Global Financial Crisis and had an adverse impact on the economy of the country. 
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Second, the country has a dominating sector of oil and gas. This was reflected in the figures, thus 
for example, in 2008 they had a share of more than 60% in the GDP of the country, making up to 
60% of all state revenues and covering around 100% of the exports. Moreover, this allowed to 
attract inflows of foreign currency resources growing by around 6.7 times from 2003 to 2008. 
Although the prices on oil has dropped significantly, Azerbaijan could alleviate this negative 
impact through the foreign currency reserves.  
In 2014, Azerbaijan’s GDP composition by sectors is disbursed in the following way (see also 
figure 8): 
 
Figure 14: Azerbaijan’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
The GDP composition by end use spread around the household consumption 55.8%, government 
consumption 12.5%, investment in fixed capital 28.6%, investment in inventories 0.1% exports 
37.8% and imports -34.8% (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Azerbaijan has experienced high economic growth, which is attributable to large and growing oil 
and gas exports. On the other hand, some non-export sectors such as construction, banking and 
real estate have also featured growth.  
However, there is little success concerning the institutionalization of market-based economic 
reforms. Corruption dominates in both public and private sectors, while structural economic 
inefficiencies drag down the possible long term growth, particularly affecting the non-energy 
sector. Among a number of other factors is the need for stepped up foreign investment in the 
6% 
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non-energy sector. A big impact is played by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, which drags any prospects of economic growth for both countries (Hasanov, 
2009). 
In 2014, Azerbaijan exported USD 25.7 billion and imported USD 13.9 billion, resulting in a 
positive trade balance of USD 11.8 billion. The export of Azerbaijan is mainly concentrated on 
crude petroleum (USD 22.4 billion), refined petroleum (USD 1.16 billion), petroleum gas (USD 
374 million), raw sugar (USD 222 million) and ethylene polymers (USD 118 million). As for the 
import, the main products are cars (USD 884 million), Gold (USD 495 million), Wheat (USD 
390 million), Rolled Tobacco (USD 318 million) and packaged medicaments (USD 275 million). 
The main export destinations of Azerbaijan are Italy (USD 6.52 billion), Germany (USD 2.37 
billion), Indonesia (USD 2.05 billion), Israel (USD 1.77 billion) and France (USD 1.58 billion). 
The imports mainly come from Turkey (USD 2.41 billion), Russia (USD 2.08 billion), the 
United Kingdom (USD 1.04 billion), Germany (USD 1.02 billion) and China (USD 759 million). 
In the recent years, a tendency of declining trade with other former Soviet republics and 
increasing trade with Turkey and European countries can be observed. In regard of the intra-
regional cooperation within Black Sea region, the biggest export destinations were Russia (USD 
640 million), Georgia (USD 529 million) and Turkey (502 million). The smallest amount went to 
Serbia, while there were no obvious ties with Albania and Armenia as mentioned before (WITS). 
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria, a former Soviet satellite, is the 66th largest export economy in the world and the 45th 
most complex economy according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Bulgaria borders 
with Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. By implementing sound economic 
reforms and responsible fiscal planning, Bulgaria has grown into entering the European Union on 
1st January 2007, performing an average of 6% of growth in the period between 2004 to 2008, 
with the impact of big amounts of bank lending, consumption as well as FDI. However, there are 
a number of significant challenges for Bulgaria, one of them the still high level of corruption. On 
the other hand, the global economic crisis has sharply reduced the domestic demand, exports and 
industrial production which lead to contraction of GDP by around 5.5% in 2009, leaving the 
country to a slow recovery since (Central Intelligence Agency).  
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The GDP composition by sectors of origin has shown the following image (see also figure 8):  
 
Figure 15: Bulgaria’s GDP composition by sector of origin 2014 
The GDP composition by end use was disbursed between household consumption (60.9%), 
government consumption (16.3%), Investment in fixed capital (21.2%) and in inventories 
(0.2%), exports (66.5%) and Imports (-65%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
In 2014, Bulgaria exported USD 30 billion and imported USD 34.4 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 4.44 billion. Bulgaria exported refined petroleum (USD 2.82 
billion), refined copper (USD 1.75 billion), packaged medicaments (USD 1.03 billion), raw 
copper (USD 952 million) and wheat (USD 769 million). As for the imports, the main were 
crude petroleum (USD 3.16 billion), copper ore (USD 2.19 billion), refined petroleum (USD 
1.46 billion), petroleum gas (USD 1.19 billion) and packed medicaments (1.15 billion). The top 
export destinations of Bulgaria were Germany (USD 3.53 billion), Italy (USD 3.01 billion), 
Turkey (USD 2.72 billion) Romania (USD 2.06 billion) and Greece (USD 1.77 billion). Top 
import origins were Russia (USD 4.91 billion), Germany (USD 3.99 billion), Romania (USD 2.3 
billion), Italy (USD 2.26 billion) and Turkey (USD 1.98 billion). Out of the Black Sea region 
countries, the lowest export of Bulgaria goes to Armenia and Ukraine, at USD 24 and USD 25 
million respectively (WITS). 
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Georgia 
 
Georgia is the 122nd largest export economy in the world and the 66th most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Georgia borders with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia by land and Ukraine by sea. 
In 2008, the impact of economic crisis on Georgia was not expected to be high due to the 
relatively isolated nature of Georgia’s financial market (Akhmeteli, 2008), however in the course 
of the year, all the doubts disappeared. In the same year, the country was involved in a war with 
Russia, which lead to direct economic damage consisting of ruined settlements and 
infrastructure. Moreover, Georgia had to deal with the consequences of the 5-day war, 
particularly, liquidating the economic damage that was caused by the war, avoiding a crisis in the 
banking sector, preventing any further growth of the relatively high inflation rate, and preserving 
exchange rate stability of the national currency. (Corso, 2009).  
Georgia has been recovering since, at the same time implementing positive changes and policies 
towards creating a more prosperous country. Georgia has simplified the tax code, improved tax 
administration, cracked down petty corruption, leading to higher revenues. Moreover, an 
important step was signing an association agreement with the EU that allowed free trade and 
visa-free travelling. 
In 2015 Georgia’s GDP composition by sector was the following (see also figure 8):  
 
Figure 16: Georgia’s GDP Composition per Sector of Origin 2014 
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GDP composition by the end use is combined of household consumption (71.2%), government 
consumption (16.5%), investment in fixed capital (28.5%) and in inventories (3.7%), exports 
(45%) and imports (-64.9%) (Central Intelligence Agency) 
In 2014, Georgia exported USD 3.58 billion and imported USD 8.91 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 5.33 billion. Georgia mainly exports cars (USD 513 million) 
refined petroleum (USD 318 million), ferroalloys (USD 299 million), copper ore (USD 240 
million) and wine (USD 192 million). As for the exports, the top are refined petroleum (USD 
931 million), cars (USD 716 million), petroleum gas (USD 363 million), packaged medicaments 
(USD 317 million) and broadcasting equipment (USD 159 million). Georgia’s main export 
destinations are Azerbaijan (USD 540 million), the United States (USD 323 million), Russia 
(USD 293 million), Bulgaria (USD 270 million) and Armenia (USD 254 million). The main 
sources for import are Turkey (USD 1.72 billion), China (USD 777 million), Azerbaijan (USD 
625 million), Russia (USD 576 million) and Ukraine (USD 540 million). Among the Black Sea 
countries, the smallest export activity was held with Serbia and Albania, exporting USD 137 
thousand and USD 216 thousand respectivelyv (WITS). 
 
Greece 
Greece is the 63rd largest export economy in the world and the 54th most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Greece has borders with Turkey, Albania, 
Bulgaria and Macedonia by land, and with Egypt, Libya, Cyprus and Italy by sea. 
Amongst the other countries of the Black Sea Region, Greece, has the advantage of not having a 
Communist past. Moreover, Greece is a member of the EU and can be described by quite a high 
degree of EU market integration. In spite of a relatively high level of economic development, 
Greece has not been able to avoid the negative impact of the global financial crisis (Tremonti, 
2009). From the very beginning, optimism for the impact of the crisis was created due to the 
stability of Greece’s banking system as well as by the fact that it is not an industrial country and 
its economy is not significantly dependent upon its exports (shipping and tourism are important 
for the country) (Zompoulidis, 2009). The Greek economy averaged growth of about 4% per 
year between 2003 and 2007, but the economy went into recession in 2009 as a result of the 
world financial crisis. By 2013 the economy had contracted 26%, compared with the pre-crisis 
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level of 2007. Greece met the EU's Growth and Stability Pact budget deficit criterion of no more 
than 3% of GDP in 2007-08, but violated it in 2009, with the deficit reaching 15% of GDP. 
Under intense pressure from the EU and international market participants, the government 
accepted a bailout program that called on Athens to cut government spending, decrease tax 
evasion, overhaul the civil-service, health-care, and pension systems, and reform the labor and 
product markets. Austerity measures reduced the deficit to 3% in 2015.  
The GDP of Greece by sector of origin has the following image:  
 
 
Figure 17: Greece’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
GDP composition by end use is shared among household consumption (70.5%), government 
consumption (20.2%), investment in fixed capital (11.7%) and inventories (-2.2%), export 
(30.2%) and Import (-30.3%) (Central Intelligence Agency) 
In 2014, Greece exported USD 33.2 billion and imported USD 60.8 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 27.6 billion. The top exports of Greece are refined 
petroleum (USD 10.5 billion), packaged medicaments (USD 1.24 billion), aluminum 
plating (USD 705 million), non-fillet fresh fish(USD 548 million) and  processed 
vegetables (USD 458 million). The top imports are crude petroleum (USD 13.3 billion), refined 
petroleum (USD 4.24 billion), packaged medicaments (USD 2.88 billion), passenger and cargo 
ships (USD 2.53 billion) and petroleum gas (USD 1.19 billion). The top export destinations of 
Greece are Turkey (USD 4.16 billion), Italy (USD 3.08 billion), Germany (USD 2.27 billion), 
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Bulgaria (USD 1.67 billion) and Cyprus (USD 1.62 billion). The main import origins are 
Germany (USD 6.24 billion), Russia (USD 5.66 billion), Italy (USD 4.76 billion), Iraq (USD 
4.75 billion) and China (USD 3.39 billion).  In 2014, exports towards the Black Sea region were 
around USD 889 million, while the lowest went to Armenia at around USD 12 million (WITS). 
 
Moldova 
Moldova is the 126th largest export economy in the world and the 76th most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Moldova borders Romania and Ukraine. 
Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe, with its economy vulnerable to 
corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, Russian political and economic 
pressure, and unresolved separatism in Moldova's Transnistria region (Chandy et al., 2009). With 
a moderate climate and productive farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agriculture 
sector. With few natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies 
from Russia and Ukraine. 2014. Romanian gas exports to Moldova are largely symbolic. 
Moldova also depends on annual remittances of about $1.12 billion from around one million 
Moldovans working in Europe, Russia, and other former Soviet countries. In 2009, Moldova 
experienced the impact of not only global financial crisis, but also a thorny political crisis 
emerging from it (Lamond, 2009). The GDP decreased rapidly, while a significant number of 
working migrants from Moldova returned to the country, further increasing the unemployment 
problem (UNDP, 2009). In 2009, Moldova failed to elect a President due to contradictions within 
its Parliament thereby creating an unstable political environment for the government.  
In 2014 the GDP composition per sector of origin was the following:  
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Figure 18: Moldova’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
GDP by end use was disbursed between household consumption (89.7%), government 
consumption (20.7%), investment in fixed capital (23.6%) and in inventories (1.3%), 
exports (43.2%) and imports (-78.5%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Forward to 2014, Moldova exported USD 2.97 bllion and imported USD 5.64 billion, resulting 
in a negative trade balance of USD 2.67 billion. The top exports of Moldova are insulated 
wire (USD 268 million), sunflower seeds (USD 135 million), wheat (USD 127 
million), packaged medicaments (USD 119 million) and hot-rolled iron bars (USD 118 million). 
Its top imports are refined petroleum (USD 687 million), packaged medicaments (USD 253 
million), planes, Helicopters, and Spacecraft (USD 172 million), cars (USD 154 million) 
and rolled tobacco (USD 103 million). The top export destinations of Moldova 
were Romania (USD 508 million), Russia (USD 478 million), Italy (USD 325 
million), Germany (USD 162 million) and Turkey (USD 148 million). The top import origins 
are Romania (USD 856 million), Ukraine (USD 664 million), China (USD 475 
million), Germany (USD 446 million) and Russia (USD 375 million). Moldova has exported 
around 1 billion towards the Black Sea Countries, with the smallest export to Albania at USD 
165 000 (WITS).  
 
Romania 
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Romania is the 46th largest export economy in the world and the 38th most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Romania has borders with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine by land and Turkey by sea. 
Romania began its transition from communism in 1090 with a large obsolete industrial base and 
a pattern of output that didn’t suit the country’s needs. Romania was one of the latest countries to 
join the European Union (2007), therefore not yet fully integrated into the EU market when the 
global financial crisis arrived (Petrova). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Romania 
signed a $26 billion emergency assistance package from the IMF, the EU, and other international 
lenders, but GDP contracted until 2011. Economic growth rebounded in 2013-15, driven by 
strong industrial exports and excellent agricultural harvests, and the fiscal deficit was reduced 
substantially. Industry outperformed other sectors of the economy in 2015. Exports remained an 
engine of economic growth, led by trade with the EU, which accounts for roughly 70% of 
Romania trade.  
In 2014 Romania’s GDP composition per sector of origin was as follows (see also figure 8): 
 
Figure 19: Romania’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin, 2014 
GDP composition by end use was disbursed among household consumption (67.9%) government 
consumption (7%), investment in fixed capital (24.7%) and in inventories (0.9%), exports 
(41.1%) and imports (-41.6%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
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In 2014, Romania exported USD 71.4 billion and imported USD 75.6 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 4.26 billion. The top exports of Romania are vehicle parts (USD 
4.73 billion), insulated wire (USD 3.94 billion), cars (USD 3.78 billion), refined petroleum (USD 
3.36 billion) and wheat (USD 1.96 billion). Its top imports were crude petroleum (USD 4.41 
billion), vehicle parts (USD 3.02 billion), packaged medicaments (USD 2.86 billion), insulated 
wire (USD 1.57 billion) and cars (USD 1.52 billion).The top export destinations of Romania 
are Germany (USD 13.1 billion), Italy (USD 7.93 billion), France (USD 4.32 
billion), Turkey (USD 3.47 billion) and Hungary (USD 2.96 billion). The top import origins 
are Germany (USD 14.1 billion), Italy (USD 7.98 billion), Hungary (USD 5.75B 
billion, France (USD 4.3 billion) and Poland (USD 3.41 billion). Export of Romania towards the 
Black Sea countries in 2014 was around USD 1.17 billion, while the lowest export went to 
Armenia at USD 7.68 million (WITS). 
 
Russia 
 
Russia is the 10th largest export economy in the world and the 27th most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Russia has borders with Azerbaijan, China, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, North Korea, Belarus, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland and Ukraine by land and Japan and the United States by sea. Russia has 
undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally 
planned economy towards a more market-based system. Since the financial crisis of August 
1998, Russia’s economy has developed at an impressive pace; GDP growth almost doubled over 
the past ten years, and the economy has become much more attractive to foreign investors 
(OECD, 2009). The impact of the global financial crisis on Russia’s economy can be attributed 
not only to foreign but, rather, to domestic factors, particularly to the accumulated unsolved 
problems characteristic of the country’s industry and its economy as a whole (Aslund, 2008). 
Dzasarov (2009) suggests, that national factors underlie in Russia’s crisis and that the global 
financial crisis is only an additional one piled up in the financial, technological, economic, and 
political crises of Russia. It is important to mention, that oil, gas and metal prices in international 
markets plunged, causing a GDP growth rate decrease and increase unemployment (Bulatov, 
2009). Russia’s reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that 
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follow the volatile swings in global prices. Moreover, combination of falling oil prices, 
international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015. 
In 2014 Russia’s GDP composition by sector of origin was as follows: 
 
Figure 20: Russia’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
The GDP by end use was disbursed among household consumption (54.1%) government 
consumption (19.1%), investment in fixed capital (21.7%) and in inventories (-3.4%), Exports 
(29.8%) and Imports (-21.2%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
In 2014, Russia exported USD 449 billion and imported USD 295 billion, resulting in a positive 
trade balance of USD 154 billion. The top exports of Russia are crude petroleum (USD 155 
billion), refined petroleum (USD 88.3 billion), petroleum gas (USD 35.9 billion), coal 
briquettes (USD 12.7 billion) and raw aluminum (USD 7.64 billion). Its top imports 
are cars (USD 15.7 billion), Packaged Medicaments (USD 10.2 billion), Vehicle Parts (USD 9.5 
billion), Planes, Helicopters, and Spacecraft (USD 7.43 billion) and Computers (USD 5.75 
billion).  
The top export destinations of Russia are China (USD 39.3 billion), the Netherlands (USD 39 
billion), Germany (USD 29.8 billion), Italy (USD 22.9 billion) and Japan(USD 21.5 billion). The 
top import origins are China (USD 50 billion), Germany (USD 37.3 billion), the United 
States (USD 16.5 billion), Belarus (USD 14.9 billion) and Italy (USD 12.4 billion). In 2014 
Russia’s export towards the Black Sea countries was around USD 36 billion, with the smallest 
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export going to Albania at around USD 80 million. The biggest export of USD 14.7 billion went 
to Turkey, followed up by Ukraine at USD 11.3 billion (WITS). 
 
Serbia 
Serbia is the 76th largest export economy in the world and the 41st most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Serbia borders with Albania, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Romania 
Although Serbian government remained confident at first that the global financial crisis would 
not affect Serbia a lot, the impact of it became particularly big in 2009, as the GDP increased by 
5.5% in 2008 as compared to 2007, it is expected that it decreased by 2.9% in 2009 as compared 
to 2008. (SORS, 2009).  
In 2014, the GDP of Serbia by sector of origin was as follows: 
 
Figure 21: Serbia’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
As for the GDP composition by end use, it was disbursed among government consumption 
(11.4%), investment in fixed capital (18.1%) and in inventories (-1.1%) exports (47.7%) and 
imports (-57.4%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
In 2014, Serbia exported USD 15.1 billion and imported USD19.8 billion, resulting in a negative 
trade balance of USD 4.65 billion. The top exports of Serbia are cars (USD 1.79 
billion), insulated wire (USD 550 million), corn (USD 542 million), rubber tires (USD 420 
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million) and frozen fruits and nuts (USD 367 million). Its top imports are vehicle parts (USD 
1.14 billion), crude petroleum (USD 1.05 billion), petroleum gas (USD 752 million), refined 
petroleum (USD 728 million) and packaged medicaments (USD 624 million). 
In 2014, the top export destinations of Serbia were Italy (USD 2.51 billion), Germany (USD 1.77 
billion), Bosnia and Herzegovina (USD 1.19 billion), Russia (USD 1.06 billion) 
and Montenegro (USD 695 million). The top import origins were Germany (USD 2.2 
billion), Italy (USD 2.12 billion), Russia (USD 2.07 billion), China (USD 1.27 billion) 
and Hungary (USD 1.11 billion). Serbia has exported around USD 2.9 billion towards the Black 
Sea countries, with the lowest export to Armenia for around USD 1.7 million and the highest one 
after Russia being Romania at around USD 829 million (WITS).  
 
Turkey 
 
Turkey is the 27th largest export economy in the world and the 51st most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Turkey has borders with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria and Greece by land and Egypt, Cyprus, Romania, 
Russia and Ukraine by sea. 
After Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2001, a number of financial and fiscal 
reforms were adopted as part of an IMF program (Koch and Chaudhary, 2001). The reforms 
strengthened the country's economic fundamentals and ushered in an era of strong growth 
averaging more than 6% annually until 2008. Global economic conditions and tighter fiscal 
policy caused GDP to contract in 2009, but Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and 
banking system helped the country weather the global financial crisis. The Turkish economy, 
however, retains significant weaknesses. Specifically, Turkey's relatively high current account 
deficit, uncertain commitment to structural reform, and turmoil within Turkey's neighborhood 
leave the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shifts in investor confidence.  
In 2014, the GDP of Turkey by sector of origin was as follows: 
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Figure 22: Turkey’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
GDP by end use was disbursed among household consumption (68.6%), government 
consumption (15.7%), investment in fixed capital (20.3%) and in inventories (-1.7%), 
exports (27.9%) and imports (-30.8%) (Central Intelligence Agency). 
In 2014, Turkey exported USD 165 billion and imported USD 217 billion, resulting in a negative 
trade balance of USD 51.2 billion. The top exports of Turkey were cars (USD 7.95 
billion), vehicle parts (USD 4.73 billion), raw iron bars (USD 4.28 billion), delivery trucks (USD 
4.15 billion) and jewelry (USD 4.06 billion). Its top imports were refined Petroleum (USD15.7 
billion), cars (USD 7.94 billion), gold(USD 7.51 billion), scrap iron (USD 6.65 billion) 
and petroleum gas (USD 6.56 billion). The top export destinations of Turkey were 
Germany (USD 16.9 billion), Iraq (USD 10.8 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 10.3 
billion), France (USD 7.87 billion) and Italy (USD 7.58 billion). The top import origins 
were China (USD 24.6 billion), Germany (USD 23.5 billion), Russia (USD 14.7 
billion), Italy (USD 12.3 billion) and the United States (USD 11.8 billion). Turkey has exported 
around USD 20 billion towards the Black Sea countries, with the highest export going to Russia 
at USD 5.9 billion followed by Romania at around USD 3 billion. The lowest export was to 
Albania at around USD 318 million, while there were no relations with Armenia for the year 
2014 (WITS). 
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Ukraine 
Ukraine is the 52nd largest export economy in the world and the 31st most complex economy 
according to the Economic Complexity Index (OEC). Ukraine borders with Belarus, Hungary, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia by land, and Georgia and Turkey by sea. After 
Russia, the Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component of the former Soviet 
Union. Shortly after independence in August 1991, the Ukrainian Government liberalized most 
prices and expanded the legal framework for privatization, but widespread resistance to reform 
within the government and the legislature soon stalled reform efforts and led to some 
backtracking. International institutions such as IMF encouraged Ukraine to quicken the pace and 
scope of reforms to foster economic growth. Ukrainian Government officials eliminated most tax 
and customs privileges in a March 2005 budget law, bringing more economic activity out of 
Ukraine's large shadow economy. Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy supplies and the 
lack of significant structural reform have made the Ukrainian economy vulnerable to external 
shocks. As the global financial crisis started to spread towards the Eastern European countries, 
rather pessimistic forecasts were made for Ukraine (Elroy and Wall, 2009). The turbulent 
political life that characterized the country for years had significant repercussions, thus leaving 
the Ukrainian economy extremely vulnerable to the ongoing crisis (Aris, 2009) The political 
instability in Ukraine reflects mostly on the country’s financial system, as for example the 20% 
of the national currency depreciated following the beginning of the crisis (Aslund, 2009). 
Ukraine was the country most affected by the global financial crisis,345 having experienced the 
worst economic downturn amongst the Black Sea Region countries. (Gavras and Iorga, 2009). 
The Ukrainian economy slowly stabilized throughout the period of 2010-2014, by making a 
significant progress on reforms. However, Russia’s occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and on-
going aggression in eastern Ukraine have hurt economic growth.  
The GDP of Ukraine by Sector Origin in 2014 was as follows: 
60 
 
 
Figure 23: Ukraine’s GDP Composition by Sector of Origin 2014 
While the GDP by end use was disbursed among the household consumption (67.6%), 
government consumption (19%), investment in fixed capital (13.3%) and in inventories (2%), 
Exports (52.8%) and Imports (-54.8%) (Central Intelligence Agency).  
In 2014, Ukraine exported USD 58.2 billion and imported USD 58.3 billion, resulting in a 
negative trade balance of USD 180 million. The top exports of Ukraine are semi-finished 
iron (USD 5.39 billion), seed oils (USD 3.58 billion), corn (USD 3.38 billion), iron ore (USD 
3.35 billion) and wheat (USD 3.31 billion). Its top imports are refined petroleum (USD 7.94 
billion), petroleum gas (USD 6.81 billion), packaged medicaments (USD 2.13 billion), coal 
briquettes (USD 1.52 billion) and cars(USD 1.21 billion). The top export destinations of Ukraine 
are Russia (USD 9.9 billion), Egypt (USD 4.6 billion), Turkey (USD 3.67 billion), China (USD 
2.74 billion) and Italy (USD 2.66 billion). The top import origins are Russia (USD 13.9 
billion), Germany (USD 5.52 billion), China (USD 5.46 billion), Belarus (USD 4.08 billion) 
and Poland (USD 3.53 billion). Among the Black Sea countries, Ukraine had the second biggest 
export (after Russia) to Turkey at around USD 3.65 billion. The smallest export went to Albania 
at USD 2.45 million (WITS). 
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Research Methodology 
In this thesis, the Cooperation in the Black Sea region has been viewed through both the political 
and economic lenses, and a respective empirical analysis has been performed in order to 
understand how these two lenses are connected, what tendencies can be found with the economic 
cooperation.  
As the region has a number of conflicts among different countries, it was important to see 
whether these tensions are somehow correlated with the economic cooperation in the region. On 
the other hand, it was important to understand whether there was any correlation between 
economic complexity of the country and economic cooperation in the region. Thus, I have tried 
to analyze if the economic complexity and political stability are both affected by the exports and 
the GDP Per Capita. 
The analysis was performed with STATA program. Through the empirical analysis, the twelve 
countries of the Black Sea region have been viewed for the period from 1996 to 2014. Although 
the data covers less than 23 years, we cannot be precisely sure about the results. The following 
variables have been chosen: 
• Political Stability Index: Political 
• Economic Complexity Index: Econcom 
• GDP Per Capita: pcgdp 
• Export of each country to the Black Sea region: Export  
The Political Stability Index is a composite measure as it is based on several other indexes from 
multiple sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum, and the 
Political Risk Services, among others. The underlying indexes reflect the likelihood of a 
disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, 
international tensions, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. The Political Stability 
Index varies from -2.5 to 2.5, indicating respectively weak and strong stability (The World Bank 
World Governance Indicators). 
The Economic Complexity Index is a holistic measure of the production characteristics of large 
economic systems, usually whole countries. The goal of this index is to explain an economic 
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system as a whole rather than the sum of its parts. To achieve this goal, the ECI combines 
metrics of the diversity of countries and the ubiquity of products to create measures of the 
relative complexity of a country's exports. In the mathematical definition, the ECI is defined as a 
projection of the matrix connecting countries to the products they export. Since the ECI 
considers information on the diversity of countries and the ubiquity of products, it is able to 
produce a measure of economic complexity containing information about both the diversity of a 
country's export (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). The data was retrieved from the observatory of 
economic complexity, a tool created to quickly compose a visual narrative about countries and 
the products they exchange. The tool was conducted at the MIT Media Lab Macro Connections 
Group (OEC). 
The data for GDP Per Capita was taken from the World Bank. For the analysis, the GDP Per 
Capita variable was taken in logarithm in order to make the distribution more clear and help to fit 
the variable into the model.   
The data for the Export was taken from World Indicated Trade Solutions (WITS) and includes 
the export of each country (in USD thousand) of the Black Sea region towards the other 11 
countries inside the region. 
A dummy variable have been created based on the mean of export, given a value of 0 if the 
export was lower than the mean, and value of 1 if the export was higher than the mean. 
For the analysis I have looked at how political stability is correlated with exports and GDP Per 
Capita through the following formula: 
Political=a+b1loggdppc+b2export+n 
The similar pattern was implemented in looking at the correlation between Economic 
Complexity with exports and GDP Per Capita: 
Econcom=a+b1loggdppc+b2export+n 
The empirical analysis shows that Export and GDP impact the Political Stability and Economic 
complexity. However, although they have some influence in shaping the indices, there are still 
more variables that should be further analyzed in order to better understand the correlations. 
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Empirical Analysis 
First and foremost, all the data was transferred into STATA program. A logarithm of pcgdp was 
created. As a next step, the mean of the export was measured, in order to create the dummy 
variable 
 
The mean has obtained the value of USD 5995001 thousand. The dummy variable has received a 
value of 0, if the export volume was less than the mean, and 1, if the export volume was higher 
than the mean. 
The correlation between the variables of Political Stability and Export, Political Stability and PC 
GDP, as well as Economic Complexity and Export, Economic Complexity and PC GDP was 
checked through the correlation command: 
 
We can see that there was a negative correlation between the Political Stability and Export, while 
the Political Stability and the logarithm of PC GDP have obtained positive correlation. 
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The correlation between Economic Complexity and Export is positive, so is the correlation 
between Economic Complexity and logarithm of PC GDP. 
A regression was run between the political stability and logarithm of PC GDP:  
 
This means, that when PC GDP increases by 1%, the Political Stability Index increases by 
0.0016. The P-value is lower than ἀ=0.05, which means that logpcgdp is statistically significant 
at 5% level of significance. However, only around 7% of the variation is described by the PC 
GDP. The scatter plot shows the positive correlation between Political Stability Index and 
logarithm of PC GDP: 
 
And the negative correlation between Political Stability Index and Export: 
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The next step was checking the correlating the political stability with logarithm of PC GDP and 
Exports:  
 
Holding all other variables constant, when PC GDP increases by 1%, the Political Stability Index 
increases by 0.0024. Holding all other variables constant, when the exports increase by 1% the 
Political stability index decreases by 1.92%. The P-values for both variables are lower than 
ἀ=0.05, which means that the variables are jointly significant at 5% level of significance. The R-
squared shows that around 16% of the variation of the Political Stability Index is explained by 
PC GDP and Export. 
In the next step, the correlation was found between the Political Stability Index, logarithm of PC 
GDP and the dummy variable: 
 
The regression shows that holding other variables constant, when the export of the country is 
higher than USD 5995001 thousand, the Political Stability Index decreases by 27%. The 
following countries have received the value of 1 for the dummy: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. These countries affect the Political Stability Index. 
The R-squared shows that around 10% of the variation of Political Stability Index is explained 
by the variables. 
Next, the correlation between economic complexity and logarithm of PC GDP was checked: 
66 
 
 
The regression shows, that when the GDP PC increases by 1%, the Economic Complexity Index 
increases by 0.0005. The P-value is equal to 0.064 which is higher than ἀ=0.05, however is lower 
than ἀ=0.1, thus is statistically significant at 10%. The R-squared value shows that 1% of the 
variation of Economic Complexity Index is explained by logarithm of PC GDP. The Scatter Plot 
shows of Economic Complexity Index and logarithm of PC GDP shows the positive correlation: 
 
The Scatter Plot of Economic Complexity Index and Exports shows the positive correlation 
between the variables: 
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Next, the regression was run between the Economic Complexity Index, logarithm of PC GDP 
and Export: 
 
The P-value of logarithm of PC GDP is equal to 0.733 which is higher than ἀ=0.05, it is even 
higher than ἀ=0.1, which means, that the P-value doesn’t prove the variable to be statistically 
significant. The P-value of exports is equal to 0 which is lower than ἀ=0.05, which means that 
the variable is statistically significant. R-squared shows that 11% of the variation of Economic 
Complexity Index is explained by logarithm of PC GDP and Export. 
In the next step the correlation between the Economic Complexity Index, logarithm of PC GDP 
and the dummy variable was checked: 
 
The regression shows that holding other variables constant, when the export of the country is 
higher than USD 5995001 thousand, the Political Stability Index increases by 49%.  The R-
squared shows that around 20% of the variation of Economic Complexity Index is explained by 
the variables. The following countries have received the value of 1 for the dummy: Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. These countries affect the Economic Complexity 
Index. 
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Prospects and Recommendations for Regional Cooperation 
Regional cooperation remains the better, though not always the easiest, option as it requires 
strong and steady commitment towards creating an attainable, well defined region. 
The phenomenon of regionalism is present in all parts of the world taking a range of shapes and 
acquiring various dynamics. As a process, it is driven by a combination of economic and 
political forces; sometimes politics pave the way for economic integration, and sometimes 
economics lead the way (Tassinari, 2006). Moreover, regional cooperation is not an end in itself. 
Instead, it is a gradual, multifaceted, long-term process which requires durable commitment to 
deliver. Tassinari further concludes, that in the last twenty years, economic difficulties and the 
need for managing regional public goods (such as environment, trade, financial stability, and 
knowledge) have generated strong demands for regional cooperation and integration. In the 
Black Sea, these demands for policy coordination and regional responses need to be efficiently 
channeled into regional policy-making processes. In the 21st century regionalism has shifted 
more to governance rather than integration. The need for regional institutions comes from the 
inability of global ones to respond to region specific needs in a timely and efficient manner. 
Responsible sovereignty (UNDP) is a strategy that can be implemented in the region, whereby 
countries engage in fair, rule-based, and accountable international cooperation, joining collective 
endeavors that enhance welfare.  
As Pascal Lamy (2010) has argued the toolbox for regional integration includes more of efficient 
procedures for delivering business visas and regional agreements on standards as tools that are 
more likely to help integration than a customs union or common external tariff, which were the 
leading tools of previous decades. As the most successful case of cooperation, the European 
experience shows cooperation requires steady determination and political commitment. 
However, to turn regional integration into a collective project the involvement of business people 
and civil society is also critically important. Intergovernmental processes in the Black Sea would 
be invigorated by more active and greater participation of civil society actors, including the 
business community from within as well as outside the Black Sea which can bring additional 
resources as well as valuable solutions to critical regional problems.  
BSEC has formed an agenda in 2012 that aims to help member states to make use of the potential 
of the organization as a platform of dialogue to play a more proactive, effective and constructive 
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role in promoting the common goal of peaceful, stable and prosperous region. The agenda takes 
into account the developments that have taken place both since the establishment of the BSEC 
both inside the Organization itself and in the broader international environment, including the 
EU enlargement process and the new challenges in the region (BSEC, 2012). 
The implementation of the economic agenda will include three main dimensions that are 
pursuing sustainable development, strengthening project oriented dimensions of BSEC as well as 
cooperating with international and regional organizations and institutions. By pursuing 
sustainable development it will be possible to ensure the rational balance between economic 
growth with the view to further strengthen economic cooperation in the region, ensure 
sustainable development of human resources considering the prevailing demographic trends and 
their impact on employment, education and training. Strengthening the Project-oriented 
Dimension of the BSEC by implementing the already existing and identifying new projects of 
common interest for the Member States will reinforce economic cooperation in the region and at 
the same time stimulate the interaction among the national economies of the BSEC Countries. 
Establishing cooperation with International and Regional Organizations and Institutions such as 
UN, EU, OECD, World Bank, WTO, etc. will allow creating closer ties and outlining the most 
important cooperation areas.  
Manoli (2014) advises in favor of a regional strategy to address the three strategic “I’s” in the 
regional strategy. Those are an inclusive, innovative and integrated Black Sea region. To meet 
these goals, Manoli advises to include a coordinated phased approach by BSEC, which is by far 
the most advanced organization in the region. The most crucial steps would be: 
• Raising awareness among Black Sea actors of the added value and benefits of regional 
cooperation  
• Implementing projects that would bring some visible results  
• Identifying long-term projects of significant welfare impact  
The traditional welfare related arguments in favor of regionalism are today reinforced by needs 
arising from current challenges posed by globalization and the post-crisis world order. Black Sea 
economies vary in size but on the same time are small in their majority. Thus, especially in this 
regard, regionalism expands national markets, promotes trade and capital flows, and stimulates 
production (Manoli, 2012). Today, development strategies are increasingly based on strategic 
international partnerships in production, logistics, investment, and technology. This is where 
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regionalism brings added value and becomes an indispensable policy tool. Manoli outlines, that 
the Black Sea has many strengths upon which a long term regional strategic framework can build 
to improve the living conditions and quality of life of its people and promote an inclusive, 
innovative, and integrated Black Sea region. Namely, the availability of rich natural resources 
and a well educated workforce offer opportunities for productive activities. Moreover, its 
geographical location at the crossroads of major trade routes neighboring developing as well as 
developed economies gives the Black Sea significant geoeconomic potential.  
Experience not only from Europe but from other areas in the world shows that greater 
cooperation can be beneficial for the wider Black Sea area. However, in order to succeed, there 
will be a great need to deal with the challenges of productivity, complementarities, and 
innovation. Deficiency in productivity, competitiveness, and innovation represent structural 
burdens to equitable development. Cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, energy, 
connectivity, and trade facilitation are crucial for competitiveness and growth, a central 
challenge facing the Black Sea region.  
Manoli strongly believes that the main focus should be aimed at identifying the key drivers of 
change, and follow with the implementation. As such, Manoli outlines the development of 
private sector, good governance and institutions, knowledge based economy and partnership with 
development institutions. These drivers should not be seen as independent of one to the other, 
since freeing up one has positive spill-over effects on the others.  
More efficient regional cooperation in the Black Sea area implies enabling factor mobility, the 
facilitation of movement of finance, people, goods, and services. In this regard, the development 
of the private sector is a critical vehicle for the optimal allocation of resources to bring about 
development and regional competitiveness. The private sector and business can be considered as 
stepping stones for integration as they are the actual agents of intra-regional trade and investment 
linkages. For this, the improvement of services, some macroeconomic convergence and other 
complementary policies on regulatory frameworks including on investments are instrumental 
along with the reduction of obstacles for cross-border business (Agora without frontiers, 2005).  
Good governance refers to legitimate, rule based, and efficient policy-making processes and can 
be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, sector oriented governance, national 
governance, and local governance. As good governance implies effective institutions and the 
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influential role in policy making of non-state agents and civil society, it becomes a precondition 
for efficient regionalism and collective action (Manoli, 2010).  
In the context of a knowledge based economy, innovation and competitiveness builds upon 
trained human resources, especially in fields in which the region has or might acquire 
competitive advantages. Experience of successful regions as in Europe and Southeast Asia 
suggest that knowledge flows, learning and innovation are critical to economic development 
outcomes. Regions in the face of accelerated global market integration and competition need to 
build on environments which retain and grow the knowledge economy.  
Partnerships with development institutions is another crucial direction, as they will facilitate 
policy implementation, burden sharing and provide expertise. Among organizations that have 
significant resources committed to the region can be considered the World Bank, UNDP, EU, 
etc., and have a substantial expertise for project-oriented efforts, and could also play their role in 
supporting regionalism. 
Attention needs also to be given to rationalizing structures between the regional level and 
national level. Regionalism requires a minimum of national cooperation before any regional 
consultations can take place, and today’s mechanisms are often still too weak to ensure the 
inclusion of regional objectives in the national plans and budgets.  
Regional Strategy for the Black Sea should prioritize infrastructure and capacity building: 
Infrastructure (transport, communications, energy, science and technology) is critical for 
economic growth, productivity, export development, and balanced territorial development. 
Capacity building with regard to human capital development through technical and financial 
assistance will enable the implementation of the necessary policy changes and strengthen the 
ability of the partner ministries and organizations to successfully participate and organize 
activities within the regional cooperation framework.  
Within the 2020 vision for the Black Sea region, Aydin and Triantaphillou have outlined other 
crucial areas that should be taken into account in order to achieve an efficient regional 
cooperation. They emphasize the need to deal with the conflicts within the region. The vast 
number of conflicts throughout the Black Sea region can definitely be considered as an obstacle 
towards a regional cooperation. Thus, it is important to take a step towards a real security 
dialogue and confidence-building measures. Focus should be also put on economic issues, and 
steps should be taken to that meet common challenges and real needs. Continuous improvement 
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of business environment and facilitation of greater economic activity across borders will also be 
beneficial for regional cooperation. These should include concrete steps to facilitate business 
activity by removing various non-tariff barriers that hinder trade, investment or financing. 
 
Conclusions 
Black Sea region has undertaken a long path of reforms and development oriented activities, 
moving from the level of discussions and exchange of ideas among the member countries 
towards more certain projects in a vast number of sectors. 
However, Black Sea regionalism is considered to be weak: although on one hand, the 
cooperation has received higher attention in the regional level, however, it has remained in a 
slow process, constantly coming across political uncertainties within the member countries. 
Around other major constraints is the challenges of security, as well as over-bureaucratization of 
the institutions, namely of BSEC, which is additional obstacle on the way of regional integration 
and cooperation. On the other hand, the existence of bi-lateral cooperation agreements among the 
member countries creates an environment that doesn’t trigger incentives towards cooperation. 
Thus, Black Sea regionalism can find parallels with so called “spaghetti bowl” effect. 
The Black Sea region has undergone countless political transformations over time. And now it is 
still a subject of an intense debate. A common Black Sea regional identity is prevented by a vast 
number of factors. Crossroad-character of the Black Sea that makes it difficult to attach a 
regionally inclusive label. This implies that a close look at the list of Black Sea states shows the 
region’s character as a space of transition between other more saliently conceived regions, such 
as the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Europe or in a wider sense between Europe and Asia. 
Cultural and linguistic differences: The Black Sea region covers a number of different linguistic 
and cultural spaces that include various elements such as languages, religions, etc. Post-Soviet 
tensions together with supra-region competition are also major issues in the region.  
According to King’s opinion on the Black Sea, he considers that a set of relatively weak states 
can hardly hope to build a strong region. A zone with widely different levels of development in 
terms of the domestic economy and democratization is an unlikely candidate for interstate 
cooperation. Moreover, the widely divergent foreign policy orientations of the region’s 
constituents have made real cooperation a challenge. 
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From an economic viewpoint the Black Sea region is characterized on the one side by high 
growth rates and on the other by difficulties in implementing schemes of a market place as 
inward environment of the economic system. The economic cooperation has also suffered from a 
lack of common incentives. The fact that regional cooperation is so strongly a subject of the 
competing European and Post-Soviet approaches and its lack of regional identity thus are 
showing the failure to establish a consolidated format for regional cooperation that includes all 
relevant actors. 
There are clear incentives for regional cooperation. Trade, a crucial area for regional 
cooperation, is creating an incentive for the countries that cannot rely on the opportunity of 
exporting to the European markets, based on a number of factors such as not meeting the 
standardization procedures. However, the obstacles to regionalism are likely to remain stronger 
than the incentives. Still, the key developments in the region could produce either an impetus to 
regional cooperation or doom regional efforts for the foreseeable future. First is the resurgence of 
armed conflict. The threat of interstate violence will likely remain low. However, the persistence 
of unresolved border disputes has the potential to unleash larger-scale conflict. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned, that regional cooperation is a gradual and long process. 
And while the European experience can be considered as the most successful case of cooperation 
to look upon, however, the tools and models cannot be simply transferred to the Black sea 
region. Regional cooperation requires commitment and an inclusive strategy that will express 
regional consensus and create an innovative and integrated Black Sea Region (Manoli, 2014). 
Moreover, it is important to put the emphasis on raising awareness among Black Sea actors on 
the added value and benefits of cooperation, and identifying and implementing projects that will 
actually bring visible results and have an overall positive impact on the welfare of the member 
countries of the Black Sea region.  
There are possibilities of cooperation in the Black Sea region that can be viewed from the 
spectrum of new opportunities for the member countries. Although there are major differences in 
both the national priorities of the countries and main concerns of security matters, the 
cooperation between countries with such heterogeneous features can take place, based on first 
and foremost the real need for renewing or opening links of communication between the member 
countries. Thus, it is important to find a sense of direction at the same time balancing national 
interests, and strengthening   The Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
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wasn’t yet been empowered to a certain extend by the member countries, regional agenda should 
be identified in order to establish multilateral cooperation.  
As a bottom line, Black sea region can be characterized as having a better developed sub-
regional cooperation rather than a fully formed and operable regional cooperation. Although a 
number of factors that affect the cooperation perspective in a negative way, there is clearly a 
potential for developing it, however it can be doubted whether this potential will be explored 
further. The Black Sea could well become a region of a few small countries committed to Europe 
and Euro-Atlanticism in the midst of larger states that are at best ambivalent about their place in 
the West. None of these potential developments can guarantee that the cooperation in the black 
sea will evolve. As in the past, it might continue to be a distinct geographical zone marked by 
intensive ties of commerce, migration, and cultural commonalities. But whether the existence of 
this region will translate into a solid form of regional cooperation, even though endless efforts 
towards region-building, remains a question, as there is no common cognitive approach in the 
region.  
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Annexes 
Data for the Empirical Analysis 
Year Country Export Political Stability Index 
Economic 
Complexity PC GDP (USD) 
Country Export to BS 
Region (USD Thousand) Dummy 
1996 Albania -0.43 -0.351731 1046.359 37324.317 0 
1996 Armenia -0.52 0 503.232 68640.488 0 
1996 Azerbaijan -0.92 0.518066 409.2167 277942.614 0 
1996 Bulgaria -0.2 0.690222 1208.85 1930798.621 0 
1996 Georgia -1.69 0.388101 670.4611 147876.45 0 
1996 Greece 0.45 0.277305 13749.12 1865475.657 0 
1996 Moldova -0.13 0.234111 462.172 588264.294 0 
1996 Romania 0.49 0.675304 1643.88 1181235 0 
1996 Russia -1.23 0.65979 2643.898 12399905.99 1 
1996 Serbia -1.15 0 2749.966 411930.992 0 
1996 Turkey -1.27 0.200462 3052.498 2902495.302 0 
1996 Ukraine -0.27 0.981918 872.7092 6908771.373 1 
1997 Albania -0.545 -0.369837 749.5846 30060.318 0 
1997 Armenia -0.64 0 522.5221 68640.488 0 
1997 Azerbaijan -0.875 0.586682 505.5606 410521.182 0 
1997 Bulgaria 0.165 0.660773 1346.913 1864775.668 0 
1997 Georgia -1.73 0.520971 774.6802 171075.019 0 
1997 Greece 0.55 0.182903 13427.83 1996647.516 0 
1997 Moldova 0.04 0.161913 528.1778 390506.256 0 
1997 Romania 0.435 0.779787 1589.014 1242667.992 0 
1997 Russia -1.175 0.693451 2737.557 12240142.55 1 
1997 Serbia -1.67 0 3178.831 425601 0 
1997 Turkey -1.285 0.294054 3143.265 3824438.322 0 
1997 Ukraine -0.26 0.977325 991.2301 5248996.111 0 
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1998 Albania -0.66 -0.396345 865.3022 44261.542 0 
1998 Armenia -0.76 0 608.3366 59064.0555 0 
1998 Azerbaijan -0.83 0.368916 561.9103 354847.833 0 
1998 Bulgaria 0.53 0.647729 1771.994 1587130.472 0 
1998 Georgia -1.77 0.472457 805.2727 124006.228 0 
1998 Greece 0.65 0.249143 13472.14 1779274.812 0 
1998 Moldova 0.21 0.103473 448.8414 459703.277 0 
1998 Romania 0.38 0.637983 1864.991 1057145.016 0 
1998 Russia -1.12 0.687916 1834.847 10001402.62 0 
1998 Serbia -2.19 0 2416.069 376929 0 
1998 Turkey -1.3 0.268959 4389.725 3281350.064 0 
1998 Ukraine -0.25 0.884077 835.2603 4370505.853 0 
1999 Albania -0.655 -0.384903 1098.425 52535.449 0 
1999 Armenia -0.78 0 596.506 49487.623 0 
1999 Azerbaijan -0.88 -0.196818 573.8903 267007.312 0 
1999 Bulgaria 0.44 0.477192 1643.61 1378354.837 0 
1999 Georgia -1.38 0.432673 628.8657 131602.225 0 
1999 Greece 0.68 0.312809 13245.19 1628288.951 0 
1999 Moldova 0.385 0.010145 321.0268 280636.147 0 
1999 Romania -0.05 0.60488 1610.134 1183472 0 
1999 Russia -1.27 0.604445 1330.751 8536998.794 1 
1999 Serbia -1.945 0 2441.43 216499 0 
1999 Turkey -1.075 0.28599 4009.134 2231728.66 0 
1999 Ukraine -0.375 0.650502 635.7727 3718329.657 0 
2000 Albania -0.65 -0.221006 1175.789 42757.69 0 
2000 Armenia -0.8 0 621.4248 65599.937 0 
2000 Azerbaijan -0.93 -0.105049 655.0974 344158.406 0 
2000 Bulgaria 0.35 0.488015 1609.281 1622366.597 0 
2000 Georgia -0.99 0.561265 691.9977 193007.445 0 
2000 Greece 0.71 0.352587 12042.95 2109485.732 0 
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2000 Moldova 0.56 0.167478 354.0013 291502.186 0 
2000 Romania -0.48 0.578479 1668.163 1755248.984 0 
2000 Russia -1.42 0.828175 1771.587 11508408 1 
2000 Serbia -1.7 0 870.1365 236404 0 
2000 Turkey -0.85 0.212341 4215.162 2453429.732 0 
2000 Ukraine -0.5 0.734411 635.7128 5275554.48 0 
2001 Albania -0.52 -0.263894 1326.97 51545.896 0 
2001 Armenia -0.58   692.3016 84049.654 0 
2001 Azerbaijan -1.11 -0.823089 703.6713 318035.811 0 
2001 Bulgaria 0.375 0.468498 1762.456 1490110.608 0 
2001 Georgia -1.175 -0.0727987 733.9704 181575.987 0 
2001 Greece 0.75 0.154882 12538.18 2195584.349 0 
2001 Moldova 0.15 -0.0764835 407.7302 354172.565 0 
2001 Romania -0.045 0.650218 1839.729 1421162.008 0 
2001 Russia -0.325 0.522692 2100.362 11670572.58 0 
2001 Serbia -1.15   1634.875 241930.805 0 
2001 Turkey -0.86 0.193288 3053.865 2932470.833 0 
2001 Ukraine -0.44 0.633347 780.738 5801233.578 0 
2002 Albania -0.39 -0.249554 1453.643 53521.049 0 
2002 Armenia -0.36 0 779.8296 81742.065 0 
2002 Azerbaijan -1.29 -0.668349 763.1012 360723.955 0 
2002 Bulgaria 0.4 0.47551 2079.229 1662030.848 0 
2002 Georgia -1.36 0.0629226 779.3846 179956.499 0 
2002 Greece 0.79 0.245548 14110.31 2097246.166 0 
2002 Moldova -0.26 -0.0531524 458.6778 370983.575 0 
2002 Romania 0.39 0.640986 2124.874 1505778.008 0 
2002 Russia 0.77 0.718598 2375.059 12718048.41 1 
2002 Serbia -0.6 0 2149.909 311317.083 0 
2002 Turkey -0.87 0.0974245 3570.546 3570281.762 0 
2002 Ukraine -0.38 0.647028 879.475 5683009.015 0 
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2003 Albania -0.33 -0.109943 1890.682 74264.076 0 
2003 Armenia 0.21 0 924.464 117068.324 0 
2003 Azerbaijan -1 -0.822998 883.614 474664.129 0 
2003 Bulgaria 0.15 0.452789 2693.759 2229004.38 0 
2003 Georgia -1.35 -0.0581443 928.0108 250078.55 0 
2003 Greece 0.47 0.204318 18477.58 2776669.143 0 
2003 Moldova -0.18 -0.0425166 548.2897 477170.393 0 
2003 Romania 0.08 0.553908 2774.956 2107048.94 0 
2003 Russia -0.84 0.699684 2975.133 16630083.69 1 
2003 Serbia 0.18 0 2832.491 0 0 
2003 Turkey -1.06 0.110739 4586.811 5044444.227 0 
2003 Ukraine -1.93 0.807911 1048.522 7149742.82 1 
2004 Albania -0.45 -0.320404 2416.588 115729.966 0 
2004 Armenia -0.12 0 1181.968 117855.733 0 
2004 Azerbaijan -1.09 -0.924738 1045.026 747113.414 0 
2004 Bulgaria -0.02 0.382056 3353.564 2986897.227 0 
2004 Georgia -0.86 0.0098037 1207.367 342866.121 0 
2004 Greece 0.46 0.205379 21955.1 3251872.598 0 
2004 Moldova -0.27 0.004661 720.9409 545283.569 0 
2004 Romania 0.04 0.644029 3552.925 3460041.465 0 
2004 Russia -1.46 0.591904 4102.372 24245913.67 1 
2004 Serbia -0.56 0 3331.229 642097.313 0 
2004 Turkey -0.84 0.216734 5855.539 6778626.454 1 
2004 Ukraine -0.48 0.579003 1367.352 10412518.84 1 
2005 Albania -0.49 -0.318308 2709.143 118616.915 0 
2005 Armenia -0.06 0 1625.408 166645.541 0 
2005 Azerbaijan -1.11 -0.971125 1578.367 1121460.782 0 
2005 Bulgaria 0.13 0.31953 3852.978 3530035.026 0 
2005 Georgia -0.68 -0.0846956 1530.058 498568.239 0 
2005 Greece 0.51 0.157571 22551.74 3603307.459 0 
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2005 Moldova -0.44 -0.0088689 831.2053 608450.777 0 
2005 Romania 0.07 0.658558 4676.315 4752274.47 0 
2005 Russia -1.25 0.622396 5323.474 32552386.19 1 
2005 Serbia -0.77 0 3528.131 726643.194 0 
2005 Turkey 0.6 0.261651 7117.233 8619515.537 1 
2005 Ukraine 0.27 0.573944 1828.718 12256560.45 1 
2006 Albania -0.49 -0.49914 3005.013 134882.558 0 
2006 Armenia -0.28 0 2126.619 189215.548 0 
2006 Azerbaijan -1.08 -0.799364 2473.086 1325472.427 0 
2006 Bulgaria 0.39 0.426491 4455.69 4911152.856 0 
2006 Georgia -0.94 0.0438916 1872.68 498657.742 0 
2006 Greece 0.64 0.119851 24801.16 4581991.703 0 
2006 Moldova -0.4 -0.0616527 950.6482 529232.929 0 
2006 Romania 0.13 0.701114 5828.746 6003591.155 1 
2006 Russia -0.91 0.640153 6920.194 42162149.66 1 
2006 Serbia -0.56 0 4129.759 997602.043 0 
2006 Turkey 0.6 0.207597 7727.272 11659743.03 1 
2006 Ukraine -0.03 0.556052 2303.019 14015449.26 1 
2007 Albania -0.2 -0.286469 3603.014 200052.538 0 
2007 Armenia 0.11 0 3080.971 367674.441 0 
2007 Azerbaijan -0.65 -0.813568 3851.438 2173923.573 0 
2007 Bulgaria 0.35 0.566168 5932.9 6341582.215 1 
2007 Georgia -0.65 -0.22939 2492.129 630915.176 0 
2007 Greece 0.53 0.242029 28827.33 5180005.015 0 
2007 Moldova -0.05 0.313449 1230.435 702373.429 0 
2007 Romania 0.17 0.904527 8214.185 7409230.414 1 
2007 Russia -0.86 0.482498 9101.257 40336088.33 1 
2007 Serbia -0.61 0.680758 5458.122 1399183.184 0 
2007 Turkey -0.82 0.366959 9309.509 16904531.75 1 
2007 Ukraine 0.15 0.616758 3068.609 20455167.05 1 
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2008 Albania -0.03 0.0625361 4370.54 285311.572 0 
2008 Armenia -0.02 0 3919.975 377727.69 0 
2008 Azerbaijan -0.33 -1.2781 5574.604 2526966.167 0 
2008 Bulgaria 0.35 0.579111 7296.122 8159966.125 1 
2008 Georgia -0.91 -0.301569 3174.949 882496.572 0 
2008 Greece 0.26 0.194861 31997.28 6781346.862 1 
2008 Moldova -0.27 0.243531 1695.973 886068.801 0 
2008 Romania 0.16 0.934941 10136.47 10198605.02 1 
2008 Russia -0.76 0.314181 11635.27 70301028.43 1 
2008 Serbia -0.56 0.634831 6701.774 1752138.48 0 
2008 Turkey -0.85 0.419061 10382.32 21144087.35 1 
2008 Ukraine 0.03 0.550331 3891.038 26122305.26 1 
2009 Albania -0.05 0.564682 4114.137 121179.058 0 
2009 Armenia 0.23 0 2915.584 231296.39 0 
2009 Azerbaijan -0.29 -1.29231 4950.295 1801311.276 0 
2009 Bulgaria 0.32 0.353831 6955.988 5640559.772 0 
2009 Georgia -0.94 -0.262448 2706.589 693438.409 0 
2009 Greece -0.22 0.267714 29710.97 5114058.045 0 
2009 Moldova -0.59 -0.00129659 1525.526 688220.462 0 
2009 Romania 0.35 0.626236 8220.108 6857384.386 1 
2009 Russia -0.95 0.273984 8562.814 39640008.18 1 
2009 Serbia -0.49 0.694279 5821.305 1472052.082 0 
2009 Turkey -1.03 0.374195 8623.95 12594239.39 1 
2009 Ukraine -0.31 0.580006 2545.48 13450088.33 1 
2010 Albania -0.19 -0.496925 4094.359 322305.615 0 
2010 Armenia 0.03 0 3124.784 379287.919 0 
2010 Azerbaijan -0.25 -0.870441 5842.806 2736972.04 0 
2010 Bulgaria 0.33 0.584884 6752.552 7306211.28 0 
2010 Georgia -0.72 -0.329882 2964.477 863236.261 0 
2010 Greece -0.13 0.297462 26919.36 5612179.943 0 
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2010 Moldova -0.39 0.0408617 1631.536 872672.566 0 
2010 Romania 0.25 0.729511 8297.484 9354922.702 1 
2010 Russia -0.91 0.362986 10675 37608897.5 1 
2010 Serbia -0.44 0.656775 5411.877 2036703.564 0 
2010 Turkey -0.92 0.482404 10111.52 14756715.37 1 
2010 Ukraine -0.02 0.677275 2973.996 20079925.81 1 
2011 Albania -0.29 -0.535552 4437.812 450815.698 0 
2011 Armenia -0.09 0.580456 3417.172 441260.194 0 
2011 Azerbaijan -0.53 -1.49069 7189.691 3761896.352 0 
2011 Bulgaria 0.28 0.507367 7750.04 9455914.479 0 
2011 Georgia -0.66 -0.0679614 3725.063 1150602.486 0 
2011 Greece -0.1 0.172751 25914.68 7192981.664 0 
2011 Moldova -0.07 -0.138378 1970.571 1313260.579 0 
2011 Romania 0.17 0.717182 9200.278 11689163.37 1 
2011 Russia -0.99 0.23374 14212.08 45223310.1 1 
2011 Serbia -0.3 0.520543 6423.292 2668350.475 0 
2011 Turkey -0.96 0.369777 10538.44 18035724.41 1 
2011 Ukraine -0.08 0.478324 3569.757 28365552.65 1 
2012 Albania -0.16 -0.352057 4247.84 416770.58 0 
2012 Armenia 0.11 0.3520355 3565.518 501085.811 0 
2012 Azerbaijan -0.69 -0.656932 7393.772 3708087.57 0 
2012 Bulgaria 0.35 0.586226 7333.355 8812484.514 1 
2012 Georgia -0.67 -0.246049 4142.869 1307266.073 0 
2012 Greece -0.22 0.283137 22242.68 8418034.486 1 
2012 Moldova 0.02 0.0594646 2046.537 1266287.699 0 
2012 Romania 0.07 0.706564 8558.398 10690699.7 1 
2012 Russia -0.83 0.415059 15154.47 46585848.53 1 
2012 Serbia -0.22 0.5939755 5659.38 2673242.943 0 
2012 Turkey -1.19 0.457294 10539.37 19057281.24 1 
2012 Ukraine -0.1 0.570638 3855.421 25135222.59 1 
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2013 Albania 0.05 -0.342037 4412.346 364210.06 0 
2013 Armenia 0.07 0.23782525 3716.829 580691.97 0 
2013 Azerbaijan -0.41 -0.988968 7811.621 3422020.01 0 
2013 Bulgaria 0.15 0.561561 7656.639 9359403.32 1 
2013 Georgia -0.43 -0.0530288 4274.377 1763330.95 0 
2013 Greece -0.17 0.270186 21842.7 8809043.25 1 
2013 Moldova -0.02 0.0144264 2243.98 1406288.70 0 
2013 Romania 0.16 0.708925 9585.267 11779947.77 1 
2013 Russia -0.74 0.547873 15543.7 43853988.76 1 
2013 Serbia -0.08 0.63069175 6353.826 2990163.73 0 
2013 Turkey -1.2 0.466553 10800.36 20648608.75 1 
2013 Ukraine -0.76 0.712094 3986.283 22900630.91 1 
2014 Albania 0.47 -0.737567 4588.649 412844.50 0 
2014 Armenia -0.21 0.123615 3873.534 480524.51 0 
2014 Azerbaijan -0.5 -0.726658 7886.459 2124224.55 0 
2014 Bulgaria 0.08 0.476996 7851.265 9039335.45 1 
2014 Georgia -0.23 0.0785398 4429.65 1646977.91 0 
2014 Greece 0.02 0.337224 21627.35 8894883.58 1 
2014 Moldova -0.1 -0.218978 2244.764 1171428.85 0 
2014 Romania 0.08 0.72353 10011.79 11672830.46 1 
2014 Russia -0.84 0.984162 13902.14 36172536.81 1 
2014 Serbia 0.18 0.667408 6200.173 2915893.82 0 
2014 Turkey -1.06 0.3911 10303.9 19962876.85 1 
2014 Ukraine -1.93 0.814067 3065.164 16832800.65 1 
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